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Funding Immigrant Organizations: Suburban
Free Riding and Local Civic Presence1
Els de Graauw
Baruch College,
City University of New York
Shannon Gleeson
University of California, Santa Cruz
Irene Bloemraad
University of California, Berkeley
The authors argue that taken-for-granted notions of deservingness
and legitimacy among local government officials affect funding allo-
cations for organizations serving disadvantaged immigrants, even in
politically progressive places. Analysis of Community Development
Block Grant data in the San Francisco Bay Area reveals significant
inequality in grants making to immigrant organizations across central
cities and suburbs. With data from 142 interviews and documentary
evidence, the authors elaborate how a history of continuous migration
builds norms of inclusion and civic capacity for public-private partner-
ships. They also identify the phenomenon of “suburban free riding” to
explain how andwhy suburban officials rely on central city resources to
serve immigrants, but do not build and fund partnerships with im-
migrant organizations in their own jurisdictions. The analysis affirms
the importance of distinguishing between types of immigrant desti-
nations, but argues that scholars need to do so using a regional lens.
INTRODUCTION
When the U.S. federal government launched the War on Poverty during
the 1960s, social policy shifted to a model of public-private partnerships
where government funding went to local nonprofit organizations and com-
AJS Volume 119 Number 1 (July 2013): 75–130 75
1We are indebted to Karthick Ramakrishnan for advice and assistance; to Catherine
Barry, Dani Carrillo, Claude Fischer, Cybelle Fox, Heidy Sarabia, Margaret Weir, mem-
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munity action agencies to provide services to the disadvantaged, especially
African-Americans and the urban poor ðGrønbjerg 2001; Marwell 2004;
Reckhow andWeir 2012Þ. The ongoing privatization and devolution of pub-
lic services in the 1970s and 1980s led local nonprofits to becomekey players in
service provision, and government funding became an indispensable resource
for civil society organizations ðSmith and Lipsky 1993; Salamon 1999; Allard
2009Þ. Today various scholars argue that nonprofits, due to their localized
service functions, are uniquely situated to understand and advocate for vulner-
able populations ðBerry with Arons 2005; de Graauw 2008, 2012; McCarthy
2010;Mosley2011Þ.Given theprevalenceand importanceof thepublic-private
partnership model—one that provides critical human services and facilitates
civic and political voice—which organizations receive government support
andwhy?
We pose this questionwithin the context of a “new geography” of poverty
and immigration in the United States. Although the poverty rate remains
high in central cities, suburbs housed a larger number of poor people in 2009,
and more than two-thirds of net growth in the poor population from 2000
to 2009 occurred in suburbs ðKneebone 2010, p. 2; Kneebone and Garr
2010Þ. Renewed immigration has also generated demographic transfor-
mations: the foreign-born population grew from just 5% in 1970 to 13% in
2010 ðGibson and Jung 2006; U.S. Census Bureau 2011Þ. Many of these
newcomers moved to “new” gateway cities, suburbs, and rural areas rather
than to traditional immigrant gateways. Indeed, the changing geography
of poverty and immigration are linked: the foreign-born are, on average,
poorer than U.S.-born citizens, and today half of all immigrants living in
metropolitan areas reside in suburbs ðSinger 2004; Singer, Hardwick, and
Brettell 2008Þ.2
How do immigrant suburbs and new gateway cities respond to foreign-
born disadvantaged groups? Do they promote public-private partnerships
with organizations that advocate for and provide human and social ser-
vices to immigrants? These questions take seriously long-standing calls for
2Low-wage immigration is only one contributor to growing suburban poverty. Gen-
trification in city centers, which is pricing out poor residents, also plays a role, as does the
movement of employment opportunities outside the urban core.
bers of the University of California, Berkeley, Interdisciplinary Immigration Workshop,
and the AJS reviewers for helpful feedback; to Nij Tontisirin for GIS support; and to the
following organizations for financial support: theNonprofit AcademicCenters Council, the
Ford Foundation, PSC-CUNY 41, the Russell Sage Foundation, the Hauser Center for
Nonprofit Organizations at Harvard University, and the Wellman Family Faculty Fund
and former Institute for the Study of Social Change at the University of California, Berke-
ley. Authors’ names are listed in reverse alphabetical order; they are equal coauthors. Di-
rect correspondence to ShannonGleeson, Department of Latin American and Latino Stud-
ies, Merrill Faculty Services, University of California, Santa Cruz, California 95064. E-
mail: sgleeson@ucsc.edu
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more research into how urban and suburban locations shape residents’
lives, particularly those of immigrants ðWaldinger 1989; Baldassare 1992Þ,
and to better understand the interaction between political systems and non-
profit organizations that serve and represent vulnerable groups ðAndrews
and Edwards 2004; Berry with Arons 2005; de Graauw 2008; Mosley 2011Þ.
These questions also change the level of analysis in assessing immigrant
integration beyond individual-level outcomes such as educational attainment
orEnglish language skills to focus ongovernment responsiveness, specifically
the public goods provided to organized entities working for immigrant com-
munities.
The very limited scholarship on this topic tends to explain immigrant-
oriented public-private partnerships through a rational political exchange
model in which local government officials make strategic decisions to fund
community organizations to achieve political goals. Local elected officials
provide immigrant organizations with resources in exchange for votes within
a modern form of machine politics in New York City ðMarwell 2004, 2007Þ.
Similarly, community organizations receive support in suburban Washing-
ton, D.C., because they solve service delivery problems for bureaucrats and
politicians ðFrasure and Jones-Correa 2010Þ. These accounts elucidate the
mechanisms within particular cases, but they provide less purchase on vari-
ation among municipalities. Why do the dynamics of strategic political ex-
change not give rise to public-private partnerships for immigrant services
everywhere? Comparative research on municipal responses to immigration
suggests that partisan ideologies and electoral politics matter ðRamakrishnan
and Lewis 2005; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010Þ, as do feelings of threat
and anti-immigrant sentiment in local populations ðHopkins 2010; Bret-
tell and Nibbs 2011Þ. Not surprisingly, these studies find that migrants who
move to a liberal or progressive municipality receive a warmer welcome,
with more opportunities for public-private partnerships, than those who
face anti-immigrant politicians committed to small government and limited
public services.
We concur that partisanship and calculated political decisions matter.
We argue, however, that government officials’ normative understanding of
their community and their taken-for-granted notions of deservingness and
legitimacy affect funding in ways less intentional than those posited by the
rational political exchange model. Differences in how officials identify so-
cially constructed target populations for public policy produce variation in
public-private partnerships across immigrant destinations, even in rela-
tively welcoming regions where existing models would predict similar fund-
ing patterns toward immigrant groups.
These orientations toward immigrant groups rest on the legacy and insti-
tutional scaffolding of prior immigrant settlement. A tradition of immigra-
tion makes it “natural” to include immigrants in public-private partnerships.
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Long-standing immigration also generates an organizational infrastructure
that facilitates partnerships, particularly in larger cities with more developed
bureaucracies. It produces seasoned partners and a foundation upon which
new leaders and groups can emerge. This further legitimates immigrants as
natural stakeholders in public service provision. Social constructions of le-
gitimacy and on-the-ground organizational infrastructure are mutually re-
inforcing; together they provide immigrants in traditional gateway citieswith
more civic presence and a more supportive environment for public-private
partnerships than immigrants in new gateway cities or immigrant suburbs.
This is the case even in destinations characterized by progressive politics and
a proimmigrant environment, and it occurs despite the fact that rapid de-
mographic growth can provide new gateway cities and immigrant suburbs
with expanding fiscal resources.
In elaborating this approach, we underscore the importance of a regional
lens, especially the geographical proximity of immigrant suburbs to large
central cities. Political jurisdictions matter—community organizations and
public funding decisions are located within politically delineated spaces—
but they must be understood within the context of metropolitan regions.
Metropolitan regions are key to research on economic growth, environmen-
tal issues, transportation systems, and advocacy for social equity ðGans 2009;
Pastor, Lester, and Scoggins 2009; Weir et al. 2012Þ. They are also, we con-
tend, critical to understanding government responsiveness to immigrant res-
idents. Suburbs’ proximity to central cities influences suburban officials’ rec-
ognition of immigrant residents as a target population and their assessment
of immigrants’ local needs. We find a disjuncture between officials’ image of
the suburban bedroom community—fed by traditional perceptions that dis-
advantaged immigrants live in the ethnic neighborhoods of gateway cities—
and the reality of immigrants’ contemporary suburban settlement. Officials
also presume that immigrants can rely on the resources and services provided
in other jurisdictions. We conceptualize this phenomenon as “suburban free
riding.”
Thus, although suburbs are not devoid of civic capacity ðOliver 2001Þ,
and some might engage in the bureaucratic incorporation of immigrants
ðJones-Correa 2006, 2008Þ, we emphasize that suburban destinations take
limited responsibility for foreign-born residents, particularly when those im-
migrants are disadvantaged and the suburb is located close to a traditional
immigrant gateway city. To a significant degree, both elected and nonelected
suburban officials do not internalize the “new geography” of immigrant set-
tlement and poverty. They often view immigrant services as something pro-
vided in big cities, not in the suburbs where most immigrants now live.
Our arguments draw from a multiyear study of how four different types
of cities—a continuous immigrant gateway city ðSan FranciscoÞ, a 21st-
century immigrant gateway city ðSan JoseÞ, a large suburban immigrant
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city ðFremontÞ, and a smaller suburban immigrant city ðMountain ViewÞ—
support immigrant organizations. We draw on extensive fieldwork, in-
cluding in-depth interviews with 142 individuals, a database of registered
nonprofit organizations, and government reports of municipal funding al-
locations, to compare these four cities, all located in the San Francisco Bay
region. We examine how local government officials respond to the needs of
disadvantaged immigrant residents by assessing the financial resources
they allocate through the Community Development Block Grant ðCDBGÞ
program, a legacy of the public-private partnership model launched by the
War on Poverty.
In what follows, we first describe how public-private partnerships that
serve disadvantaged populations have changed over time. We then theo-
rize how place matters in explaining variation in public funding for im-
migrant services. After outlining our research design and data sources, we
document significant inequality in resource allocation across municipalities
within the same region. To understand the findings, we elaborate the phenom-
enon of suburban free riding and discuss how varied historical legacies of im-
migrant settlement influence civic and bureaucratic infrastructures as well as
local officials’ constructions of immigrants as target populations of public pol-
icy. We conclude by exploring the implications of our findings and consider-
ing whether theymight hold for othermetropolitan regions.
FUNDINGHUMAN AND SOCIAL SERVICES ACROSS PLACE AND TIME
Attention to place is critical for understanding public-private partnerships
that target disadvantaged groups: the poor tend to be concentrated in par-
ticular areas, community organizations operate in specific locations, and gov-
ernment allocations are usually made within circumscribed political jurisdic-
tions. For example, since 1974, when the CDBG program consolidated seven
existing federal assistance programs, officials in disadvantaged areas have
received federal monies based on local needs within their jurisdictions. When
welfare reform brought on significant cuts to social assistance in 1996—the
number of people receiving cash assistance plummeted from 14.2 million in
1994 to 3.8 million in 2008 ðDanziger 2010, p. 528Þ—poor people grew even
more reliant on community organizations for services and resources, as well as
for social networks and advocacy ðdeGraauw 2008, 2012; Small 2009;Mosley
2011Þ. The growth of poverty in U.S. suburbs has created a spatial mismatch
between traditional service providers located in central cities and the places
wheremoreandmorepoorpeople live ðPuentes andWarren2006;Allard2009;
Panchok-Berry,Rivas, andMurphy2011;ReckhowandWeir 2012;Kneebone
and Berube 2013Þ.
Immigrants with limited means face multiple disadvantages. Data from
the American Community Survey indicate that 14.8% of native-born Amer-
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icans lived in poverty in 2010, compared to 18.8% of the foreign-born and
a staggering 25.1% of noncitizen immigrants.3 Yet many immigrants are
barred from direct cash assistance, and many face barriers accessing public
institutions and nonprofit organizations set up for English-speaking native-
born citizens. Furthermore, the United States, unlike many other Western
countries, does not have a federal immigrant integration policy; it has instead
an uncoordinated patchwork of programs spread across multiple levels of
government that exists within an overall laissez-faire approach to immigrant
settlement ðBloemraad and de Graauw 2012Þ. Immigrants must rely on fam-
ily, coethnic networks, and community organizations for assistance and hu-
man services.
Historically, immigrant gateways like New York, Chicago, and Boston
housed the majority of immigrants and the organizations that served them.
Urban immigrants received social services, a civic education, and political in-
clusion from ethnic mutual aid societies ðBeito 2000Þ, religious institutions
ðDolan1975Þ, laborunions ðSterne 2001Þ, settlementhouses ðTrolander 1987Þ,
and political machines ðDahl 1961Þ. Consonant with ecological models of spa-
tial assimilation ðPark 1926;Massey 1985Þ, movement to the suburbs—which
correlated with greater English ability, longer U.S. residence, and more socio-
economic resources ðAlba et al. 1999; Wright, Ellis, and Parks 2005; Iceland
and Nelson 2008Þ—meant a reduced need for social and human services and
diminished interest in immigrant organizations catering to linguistic and cul-
tural differences.
Today the image of the traditional gateway city with its institutionally
complete ethnic neighborhoods does not reflect the totality of immigrant
settlement. Immigrants now skip traditional gateways and settle directly in
new gateway cities and suburbs ðSinger 2004; Frey 2006; Jones-Correa
2006Þ. Already in 1980, scholars noted that the historic link between im-
migration and inner-city neighborhoods was breaking down: two-thirds of
non-Hispanic whites in metropolitan areas lived in suburbs, but so too did
about half of Koreans, Filipinos, Asian Indians, and Cubans—the vast ma-
jority ofwhomwere foreign-born ðAlba andLogan 1991Þ. In 2005, 96%of all
foreign-born residents in the United States lived in a metropolitan area and
well over half of them resided in suburbs ðSinger 2008, pp. 7, 15Þ, giving rise
to terms such as “ethnoburbs” and “edge gateways” ðLi 1998; Logan, Alba,
and Zhang 2002; Price and Singer 2008Þ.
Building on the work of Singer and colleagues ðSinger 2004; Singer et al.
2008Þ, we identify three types of communities germane for our study. They
are distinguished by their size and historical and contemporary experiences
with immigration. First, there are the large central cities that are contin-
3The proportion refers to those below 100% of the federal poverty level. Calculations
are by the authors from the U.S. Census FactFinder tool.
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uous immigrant gateways, such as NewYork, Chicago, and San Francisco.
They have had large immigrant populations for more than a century at
proportions far above the national average. In comparison, 21st-century
gateways, such as Atlanta, Washington, D.C., and San Jose, have emerged
as major immigrant destinations over the last few decades as their immi-
grant populations tripled or quadrupled in size ðSinger 2008, pp. 8–9Þ. A
third type, suburban immigrant communities, are like the 21st-century gate-
ways in that their experience with migration is recent and characterized
by dramatic increases in the proportion of immigrants. They differ, however,
in their absolute size, withmany fewer residents and correspondingly smaller
and less complex government bureaucracies.4
The new gateway cities and immigrant suburbs are home to large num-
bers of people who face some of the same linguistic, economic, social, and
cultural challenges that made urban organizations so important to Euro-
pean newcomers a century ago. Contemporary immigrant organizations pro-
vide social services ðMarwell 2004, 2007; Cordero-Guzmán 2005Þ, fight labor
law violations ðGleeson 2008; Martin 2012Þ, express identities through cul-
tural and religious activities ðBrettell and Reed-Danahay 2012Þ, advocate for
public policies ðde Graauw 2008, 2012Þ, and promote civic and political in-
corporation ðBloemraad 2006; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008; Oka-
moto and Ebert 2010Þ. The bridging work of community organizations, long
a hallmark of immigrant integration, becomes even more critical given wel-
fare state privatization, the absence of a national integration policy, and the
elusive goal of federal immigration reform.
Today’s landscape of charitable service provision is, however, very dif-
ferent from a century ago. Not only is there an increasing spatial mismatch
between traditional service organizations and the new geography of immi-
gration but nonprofit service provision is much more entrenched in public-
private partnerships. By 1997, after more than two decades of privatization
and devolution, just over half of federal, state, and local government funds for
social services went to nonprofits ðSalamon 2003Þ. A recent survey of large
human service nonprofits found that government funding accounts for over
65% of total revenue and that 60% of organizations with government fund-
ing report that these monies are their largest source of income ðBoris et al.
2010, p. viiÞ. Among the limited studies reporting financial data for large
immigrant-serving nonprofits, there is a similar reliance on public funding
ðBloemraad 2005; Cordero-Guzmán 2005; de Graauw 2008, 2012; Frasure
4While suburbs can be defined by a population threshold or based on commute time to
work, our conception rests on a political delineation of space,which, asMassey andDenton
ð1988Þ note, divides metropolitan areas into mutually exclusive units of local govern-
ment that affect property taxes, education systems, etc. Our designation also reflects sub-
urban officials’ distinctions among the Bay Area’s big cities and what they see as their
qualitatively different bedroom communities, even if they are relatively large.
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and Jones-Correa 2010Þ. Given that public-private partnerships have become
integral to the American welfare state and advocacy efforts for marginalized
groups, do different types of municipalities provide immigrant organizations
with equitable shares of public resources? If there are differences between
municipalities, what accounts for them?
THEORIZING HOW PLACE MATTERS
Recent accounts of public-private partnerships with immigrant communi-
ties focus on rational political exchange. Elected and nonelected local gov-
ernment officials make strategic decisions to fund immigrant organizations
to achieve political goals. Studying social service provision in eight commu-
nity organizations in New York City, Marwell ð2004, 2007Þ identifies a new
formof machine politics. Inaprocess of triadic exchange, elected city officials
provide a community organizationwith patronage resources via government
contracts, the community groupprovidespatronage jobsand services to those
who support the elected officials, and residents of the community provide
votes to incumbents. One implication of this model is that organizations that
fail to provide votes might not receive funding. Yet only one of Marwell’s
eight organizations engaged in machine politics, which suggests that com-
munity organizations can access resources by means other than political ex-
change. This is important because electoral mechanisms are problematic for
immigrants: only 44% of the foreign-born had U.S. citizenship and the right
to vote in 2010.
Frasure and Jones-Correa ð2010Þ extend the political exchange model to
include nonelected officials. Studying day labor centers that cater mostly
to noncitizen immigrants in new immigrant suburbs ringing Washington,
D.C., they underscore the role of local bureaucrats who need to overcome
language and cultural barriers in serving immigrant residents but lack the
fiscal resources or service abilities to do so. Bureaucrats thus off-load human
and social service work to community organizations that act as linguistic and
cultural brokers and initiate, deliver, and staff services to immigrant resi-
dents. Elected officials go along with such partnerships because they can take
credit for the programs with minimal use of municipal resources, possibly
building future support among immigrant communities while limiting the po-
litical costs that could accompany a significant investment in new immigrant
residents. The attention to a diverse set of public officials is important since
both elected and nonelected officials influence how CDBG grants are distrib-
uted ðRimmerman 1985; Rich 1993; Rosenfeld, Reese, andGeorgeau 1995Þ.
Yet exchangemodels—either through vote buying or exploiting immigrant
community resources—leave important questions unanswered, including how
to explain variation in public support for immigrant services across different
types of municipalities. Why do not all cities fund immigrant organizations,
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given either machine politics or bureaucrats’ desire to leverage local civic
capacity? Scholarship examining variation amongmunicipalities has largely
focused on a converse process, anti-immigrant policy making, which denies
immigrant residents access to public and private resources. Ramakrishnan
and Wong ð2010Þ find that political factors—especially the partisanship of
local residents—matter more than demographic or economic factors in ex-
plaining why some municipalities propose and pass anti-immigrant ordi-
nances. Hopkins ð2010Þ contends that when national anti-immigrant rheto-
ric is politicized into feelings of threat at the local level, demographic change
increases the probability of anti-immigrant ordinances. Both arguments fo-
cus on a political exchange in which elected officials propose anti-immigrant
policies to garner votes from ðlargely native-bornÞ partisan supporters.
We find it highly plausible that public-private partnerships for immigrant
human services are more prevalent in municipalities where immigrants con-
stitute a substantial proportion of the voting population and where voters
are more politically progressive and favorably disposed toward immigrants.
These elements characterize most of the cities and suburbs ringing the San
Francisco Bay, including the four we studied. Yet, as we document below,
there is significant variation among Bay Area localities in their support for
immigrant organizations and in their views of disadvantaged immigrants.
Our research elaborates alternative mechanisms that influence resource dis-
tribution, ones that go beyond strategic political exchange and partisanship.
We instead focus on the dynamics that lead public officials to identify
immigrants as legitimate targets of public policy and as partners with local
government. We draw on Schneider and Ingram’s ð1993Þ theory of the
social construction of target populations in public policy. Such constructions
employ explicit and implicit normative characterizations of a particular
group that communicate who is deserving of public attention, what gov-
ernment should do for the group, and the appropriate participatory patterns
for the group ðSchneider and Ingram 1993, p. 334Þ. Attention to officials’
rationales and assumptions helps explain why some groups are advantaged
over others independent of traditional measures of political power or seem-
ingly objective evaluations of need ðSchneider and Sidney 2009, p. 105Þ.5
This approach seems particularly fruitful for studying immigrants who, in
political discourse, are simultaneously demonized as law breakers, welfare
abusers, job stealers, andnational security threats ðSantaAna2002;Martinez
and Valenzuela 2006; Chavez 2008; Newton 2008Þ and valorized as hard
workers, future citizens, and freedom fighters ðVoss and Bloemraad 2011Þ.
We do not focus on one particular group of immigrants but rather on the
5Schneider and colleagues are particularly interested in policy design and content. We
are primarily interested in how policy is applied given changing demographics, which
they highlight as an important area for research.
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general designation of immigrants as a constituency with needs that can be
served by public-private partnerships through programs like CDBG.
We also draw on Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad’s ð2008, p. 20Þ idea
of immigrants’ civic presence to examine how organizational infrastructures
feed into social constructions of legitimacy. These infrastructures include
bureaucracies set up by local governments to deal with particular groups as
well as immigrant communities’ civic organizations. In focusing on immi-
grant organizations, we underscore the symbolic and instrumental impor-
tance of formalized organizations doing routinized service work—what
Walker and McCarthy ð2010, p. 318Þ term an organization’s sociopolitical
legitimacy—as distinct from a political mobilization perspective that high-
lights the protest tactics employed by social movement organizations.6 When
it comes to public-private partnerships, robust organizational infrastructures
facilitate immigrants’ ability to establish a track record of service and advo-
cacy that elected and nonelected city officials draw upon in defining tar-
get populations and accounting for funding allocations ðde Graauw 2008,
2012; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008Þ. Together legitimacy and orga-
nizational infrastructures produce differences in civic presence that help gen-
erate hypotheses about how different types of localities react to needy immi-
grant residents.
Continuous Immigrant Gateways and the Legacies of History
We posit that a sustained experience with migration in traditional gateway
cities facilitates the creation and reenforcement of norms that immigrants
are legitimate target populations of policy and public-private partnerships.
This does not mean that immigrants are uniformly welcomed—indeed,
residents can challenge whether public resources should go to them—but
it does mean that immigrants are an established part of city services and de-
cision making. A city’s long history of migration provides discursive struc-
tures and established claims-making frames upon which new groups can
make appeals even if “new” immigrants are not welcomed as readily as
“older” groups. The legacy of continuous migration also builds up an infra-
6While some of the organizations in our research can be considered “hybrid organiza-
tions,” i.e., groups that fulfill multiple roles such as service, organizing, and advocacy, for
the most part groups that receive CDBG funds are not typical social movement organi-
zations. This is a conclusion also reached by others who study human and social service
organizations ðe.g., Mosley 2011Þ. Few of the organizations we study foster “direct par-
ticipation of their constituents,” which may be considered the hallmark of social move-
ment organizations, nor do they for the most part engage in protest or other types of
“extra-organizational collective action” ðMinkoff 1997, pp. 786, 780Þ. Such activities and
goals better characterize other groups in the immigrant rights movement that work
directly for the legalization of undocumented residents ðVoss and Bloemraad 2011Þ.
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structure of city institutions and immigrant organizations experienced in ad-
dressing immigrants’ needs and interests.
In contrast, immigrants in21st-centurygatewaysand suburbs—bothplaces
of new immigrant settlement—must establish organizational infrastructures
and gain legitimacy in the eyes of elected and nonelected city officials. All
things equal, this transition is likely easier in big 21st-century gateways. A
central city’s greater size generates a larger, more professional city bureau-
cracy, with greater capacity to develop relationships with community orga-
nizations and a larger funding pot that city officials can allocate to more
groups, including immigrant organizations ðRamakrishnan and Lewis 2005;
de Graauw 2012Þ. Larger cities are also more likely to hold social construc-
tions of their community that include disadvantaged residents. Thus,we posit
that 21st-century gateways will move more quickly to extend public-private
partnerships to immigrants than suburbs, even though both are new to deal-
ing with significant foreign-born populations.
Regional Dynamics and Suburban Free Riding
Suburbs have long been considered the bastion of middle-class white res-
idents who seek to escape urban social problems and redistributive tax sys-
tems ðBaldassare 1992; Gainsborough 2001; Oliver 2001; Jones-Correa
2006Þ. A traditionalway of viewing suburban–central city relations is through
the concept of parasitic or exploitative suburbs. Suburban residents free ride
on the services, cultural vitality, and economic opportunities of the racially
and socioeconomically diverse central city, but they do not pay fully for those
benefits since their property taxes go to maintenance services and suburban
school systems rather than redistribution and social services benefiting the
poor ðKasarda 1972; Hill 1974; Oliver 2001Þ.
We speculate that an analogous process of suburban free riding occurs
with immigrant services. That is, suburban immigrants are expected to—
and at times do—seek out human and social services offered by immigrant
organizations in central cities, even if they do not live there and do not con-
tribute property taxes to the central city. However, these suburban residents
are not engaged in a conscious calculation of taxation costs and central city
benefits when they turn to central city organizations; they turn to these ser-
vices because the free riding of suburban officials leaves them with no com-
parable suburban option. Our use of the term “free riding” is thus meant to
evoke the idea that suburban officials rely on a public good provided by and
paid for by others to meet their residents’ needs without incurring costs
themselves.7 This can be the product of an official’s rational calculation of
7Collective action or game-theoretic models of free riding center on a self-interested
individual’s presumed rational decision to not contribute to a public good or other col-
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fiscal costs versus electoral benefits, but it need not be. Instead, in line with
our approach underscoring the social construction of target populations, sub-
urban officials simply have a hard time conceiving of their communities as
destinations for disadvantaged immigrants, even if demographic data make
that clear and even if they hold progressive ideologies. As a result, immigrants
are not recognized as possible targets of grants making nor do suburban of-
ficials cultivate immigrant organizations as possible service partners. Indeed,
suburban immigrants might face problems precisely because of their prox-
imity to traditional gateways long associated with immigration. Proximity
makes free riding easier for suburban officials due to the availability of ser-
vices elsewhere and because of the iconic image that many hold of the tradi-
tional gateway city as the natural place immigrants should go for services
and where immigrants are presumed to feel more comfortable seeking assis-
tance.
Thus, unlike the older literature on parasitic suburbs,which pits residents
of different metropolitan jurisdictions against each other, the phenomenon
of suburban free riding that we identify places the needs of some suburban
residents, often long-standing native-born citizens, over those of other sub-
urbanites, in this case disadvantaged immigrants. The privileging of non-
immigrant residents might be done consciously due to anti-immigrant ani-
mus or conservative political ideology or for electoral gain, as outlined
by prior scholarship. But as we demonstrate, free riding can also occur in
politically progressive or moderate suburbs, where immigrant groups are
simply not identified as a significant part of the civic landscape.
The attraction of free riding also rests on the reality of limited public
funds and the many demands for services faced by public officials. Suburbs
have smaller budgets and staffs than their big city neighbors. The sheer
number of immigrants in central cities can generate economies of scale, al-
lowing immigrant organizations to better advocate for and offer services to
immigrant residents ðMarwell 2004, 2007; de Graauw 2008, 2012Þ. Yet the
potential fiscal benefits of large size should not be overstated. Central cities
often confront substantial budget deficits, and the number of demands made
on their complex bureaucracies can be a liability, especially since immi-
lective endeavor because his or her contribution is negligible for the good’s provision or
for the collective outcome. Yet, since the public good is nondivisible and nonexcludable,
he or she will still benefit, thereby “free riding” on the contributions or work of others. A
conundrum arises when all individuals make the decision to free riding since in that case
the good fails to materialize, a suboptimum outcome for everyone ðOlson 1965; Marwell
andAmes 1979Þ. Herewe employ the term in a slightly different sense. Formal free riding
theories focus on individuals, usually in large groups, while we focus on relations among
a small number of cities in close proximity and the officials who govern these cities. We
nevertheless find the term “free riding” to be useful in this context to the extent that
funding provided by large, neighboring cities subsidizes immigrant service provision to
suburban residents without any cost to suburban cities’ coffers.
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grants can be singled out for funding cuts during periods of severe budgetary
strain ðKatz 1990Þ. Also, rapid population growth due to immigration can
provide expanding fiscal resources for suburbs compared to traditional
gateways that have stable or shrinking populations; this in fact occurred
with rising CDBG allocations to the immigrant suburbs we study, whereas
San Francisco confronted stagnant funding.
A REGIONAL RESEARCH DESIGN: CENTRAL CITIES AND SUBURBS
IN THE BAY AREA
We engage in two comparisons, one contrasting the central cities of San
Francisco and San Jose to the suburban cities of Fremont and Mountain
View and a second comparing San Francisco, a continuous immigrant gate-
way, toSan Jose, a 21st-century gateway city.Table 1 provides a demographic
overview of the four cities, while figure 1 provides a visual representation.8
Our approach resembles other comparative studies that include new immi-
grant destinations ðSinger et al. 2008; Andersen 2010; Okamoto and Ebert
2010;Marrow 2011Þ, but an important novelty is that our cities lie in the same
region of the Bay Area in northern California. This allows us to uncover how
history, city size, and regional proximity matter for legitimacy, organizational
infrastructure, civic presence, and public-private partnerships, while control-
ling for the proportion of immigrants, the ideological bent of public officials,
and the regional economy.9 Political ideology, in particular, might compli-
cate comparisons, since public-private partnerships are likely more extensive
where local officials hold a progressive ideology ðRamakrishnan and Lewis
2005; de Graauw 2008, 2012Þ.10
8Population statistics in table 1 and attributed in the text to 2006 are from three-year
averages ð2005–7Þ of the American Community Survey ðU.S. Census Bureau 2009Þ. These
data match the time period of our CDBG data and field research. The map in fig. 1 is based
on 2005–9 ACS data since tract-level data are only available in five-year estimates.
9A city’s history of refugee resettlement might also matter ðBloemraad 2006; Singer
et al. 2008; Andersen 2010Þ, but this often overlaps with a history of migration.
10Scholars of urban politics often contrast the political systems of large cities to reform-
style suburban governments, which frequently include a council-manager form of gov-
ernment, at-large representative districts, and nonpartisan elections. The cities of Fre-
mont andMountain View are not, however, “pure” reform cities: Fremont has an elected
mayor and appointed city manager; in Mountain View the mayor and city manager are
appointed. San Francisco and San Jose have elected mayors, but they also have reform-
style elements: San Jose has an appointed city manager and San Francisco an appointed
city administrator. Local elections, as required by California law, are nonpartisan in all
four cities. San Francisco has experimented with both at-large and district elections,
reinstituting district elections in 2000. San Jose has had district elections since 1978.
Fremont and Mountain View both have city councils elected at-large. There is no stark
difference in the cities’ political systems.
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San Francisco is a densely populated central city with 757,604 residents
concentrated on 49 square miles of land. San Jose is a sprawling city of
898,901 residents across 174 square miles. Fremont is a large suburban city,
with a population of 208,455, located east of the San Francisco Bay. Moun-
tain View is a smaller suburban city of 71,153 between San Francisco and
San Jose. Both suburbs are relatively well off but have pockets of significant
poverty—they are what Panchok-Berry, Rivas, and Murphy ð2011Þ have
TABLE 1
Sociodemographic Profile of Selected Bay Area Cities, 2005–7
SAN
FRANCISCO SAN JOSE FREMONT
MOUNTAIN
VIEW
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Total population . . . . . . . . . . . 757,604 898,901 208,455 71,153
Non-Hispanic white ðonlyÞ . . . 338,466 45 285,249 32 65,566 32 33,973 48
Non-Hispanic black ðonlyÞ . . . 50,750 7 27,761 3 6,012 3 1,052 2
Non-Hispanic Asian ðonlyÞ . . . 238,344 32 274,338 31 96,044 46 17,959 25
Hispanic or Latino ðof any
raceÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105,790 14 281,651 31 32,108 15 15,136 21
Foreign-born ðof total
populationÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270,481 36 350,809 39 90,522 43 28,431 40
Naturalized U.S. citizen
ðof FB popÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166,504 62 177,498 51 47,683 53 9,981 35
Recent migrant, entered US
in 2000 or later ðof FB
popÞ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,074 19 74,054 21 18,360 20 8,610 30
Speaks English less than
“very well” ðof FB pop
ages 51Þ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172,782 24 222,585 27 43,978 23 14,415 22
World region of birth ðof foreign
bornÞ:
Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167,475 62 201,686 58 69,135 76 12,741 45
Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56,319 21 117,879 34 13,374 15 9,381 33
Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36,804 14 21,223 6 4,080 5 4,959 17
City residents in poverty* . . . . . . 88,426 90,996 10,969 4,499
Foreign-born residents in
poverty ðof all in povertyÞ . . . 34,400 39 38,376 42 5,250 48 2,383 53
Children under 18 living in
povertyy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30,628 63,312 8,094 3,528
Children in poverty with
one or more foreign-born
parents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,228 73 45,020 71 5,789 72 2,865 81
Median individual income in
past 12 months ð$Þ:
All residents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33,984 32,277 40,541 45,038
Foreign-born residents . . . . . . . 22,721 29,948 43,573 37,228
NOTE.—American Community Survey, three-year estimates, 2005–7 ðU.S. Census Bureau
2009Þ.
* Individuals living below 100% of the federal poverty level, past 12 months.
y Children under age 18 living at 200% or less of federal poverty level, past 12 months.
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labeled “overshadowed suburbs.”11 All four cities are Democratic strong-
holds; voters overwhelmingly voted for Democratic candidates in the past
two presidential elections. All four cities have at least one local elected official
who belongs to an ethnoracial minority group other than African-American.
They also all have hourglass economies with job growth concentrated at the
top ðhigh-paying professional and managerial jobsÞ and the bottom ðlow-
paying services jobsÞ. More than a third of each city’s population is foreign-
born, ranging from 36% in San Francisco to 43% in Fremont. As figure 1
makes clear, almost all census tracts in the region house a far higher per-
11Our studydesigndoes not permit further distinctions among suburbs by overall poverty
level or change in poverty ðAllard 2009Þ or by the particular political, social, and insti-
tutional differences in suburban poverty ðPanchok-Berry, Rivas, and Murphy 2011Þ.
Studying intersuburban variation is an important next step in this field.
FIG. 1.—Proportion of foreign-born residents, San Francisco Bay Area, ca. 2007.
Prepared by Nij Tontisirin with data from 2005–9 American Community Survey ðtract-
level estimatesÞ, U.S. Census Bureau.
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centage of foreign-born residents than the national average in 2006 ð12.5%Þ,
and inmany the proportion is three or four times greater.More than a fifth of
each city’s residents speak English “less than very well.” Compared to their
incidence in the general population, immigrantsmake up a larger share of the
poor in all four cities, and the children of immigrants—thosewith at least one
foreign-born parent—constitute a dramatically higher proportion of young
people living in disadvantaged households than children with two native-
born parents. Whether in suburbs or central cities, immigrants face socio-
economic and immigrant-specific needs due to poverty, linguistic isolation,
and, in some cases, precarious legal status.
Continuous Gateway City: San Francisco
Immigration research has long centered on historic gateways such as New
York and Los Angeles, yet San Francisco is a prime example of a contin-
uous gateway city. Incorporated in 1850, by 1920 San Francisco had a pop-
ulation of 507,000, 29% of whom were foreign-born. This proportion was
nearly twice the national average of 13%.When the foreign-born population
dipped below 5% nationally in the 1960s and 1970s, immigrants still made
up 19.3% of San Francisco’s population in 1960 and 21.6% in 1970. By 2006,
36% of city residents were born abroad, compared to 12.5%nationwide. The
largest proportion, 62%, hail from Asia, while 21% and 14%, respectively,
are from Latin America and Europe. Almost a fifth are recent migrants who
moved to the United States in the prior six years. Immigrants in San Fran-
cisco are somewhat more likely to be naturalized citizens—62%—and despite
the very high cost of living, they make up a somewhat smaller proportion of
individuals living in poverty, at 39%, than in the other three cities. How-
ever, as in the other cities, the proportion of foreign-born among the city’s
poor population is greater than the percentage of immigrants in the general
population. Moreover, children living with at least one immigrant parent
constitute an astounding 73% of all young people living in disadvantaged
households.12
San Francisco embraces a narrative as a city of immigration, not the
least because famous neighborhoods like Chinatown, the Mission, Japan-
town, and North Beach are important tourist destinations. The city has
adopted legislation of symbolic value to immigrant communities, including
naming newer ethnic neighborhoods, like “Little Saigon,” and it has passed
legislation of substantive importance, such as declaring itself a “sanctuary”
12Poverty statistics are for individuals living under 100% of the federal poverty threshold,
a metric based on an adequate food plan for different-sized families, without adjustment
for local cost of living. The data on children in disadvantaged households are for those
living under 200% of this threshold. Given the Bay Area’s high cost of living, people in
this situation are in extremely disadvantaged conditions.
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for undocumented immigrants in 1986 and adopting language access leg-
islation in 2001 ðde Graauw 2008, 2012Þ. Unlike the other three cities, San
Francisco has two municipal agencies with specific immigrant-related man-
dates: the Immigrant Rights Commission, established by ordinance in 1997,
and the Office of Civic Engagement and Immigrant Affairs, which in 2009
consolidated a handful of city administrative positions and offices responsible
for immigrant integration programs. In fiscal year 2005–6, San Francisco’s
operating budget was $5.3 billion. Despite its immigrant legacy, in 2006, only
one of 11 city legislators was Chinese American and one was Latino.13
Twenty-First-Century Gateway City: San Jose
San Jose was also incorporated in 1850, but it is a 21st-century immigrant
gateway. In 1920, San Jose was a small regional center, with fewer than
40,000 residents. Although roughly 21% were foreign-born in 1920, migra-
tion was not sustained. By the 1960s, the proportion of immigrants had de-
clined to just 8% ðGibson and Jung 2006Þ. A turning point came when San
Jose’s economy, previously centered on farming, food processing, and dis-
tribution, transformed to become the high-tech capital of Silicon Valley. In
2006, San Jose was the region’s largest city, with a population of almost
900,000. Immigration fueled part of its dramatic growth: by 2006, 39% of
San Jose residents were immigrants, with 58% from Asia and 34% from
Latin America. As in San Francisco, about a fifth are recent migrants. De-
spite images of Silicon Valley wealth, over 90,000 city residents live in pov-
erty. Of these individuals, 42% are foreign-born, a proportion greater than in
San Francisco and greater than immigrants’ share of the general population.
Seventy-one percent of children in disadvantaged households have at least
one immigrant parent.
San Jose officials usually promote proimmigrant positions, as when city
council unanimously reaffirmed the police department’s policy not to arrest
personsmerely due to unauthorized status ðSan Jose CityCouncil 2007Þ. The
bureaucratic infrastructure directed at immigrants is, however, less devel-
oped than in San Francisco, reflecting the city’s 21st-century gateway des-
ignation. San Jose’s Strong Neighborhood Initiative, established in 2002,
works with many immigrant organizations to foster civic engagement ðCity
of San Jose 2009Þ, but no city agency is specifically dedicated to immigrant
affairs. In fiscal year 2005–6, San Jose’s operating budget was $2.7 billion. In
2006, two of the 10 city councilors were Latino, as wasMayor RonGonzales,
and one councilor was Vietnamese American.
13A third local legislator was African-American; non-Hispanic whites held almost three-
quarters of legislative seats.
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Large Suburban City: Fremont
Fremont lies east of San Jose, at one end of the region’s major transit line.
Incorporated in 1956 when five small communities amalgamated, its pop-
ulation stood at 44,000 in 1960, only 5% of which was foreign-born ðABAG
2011Þ. When Portuguese immigrants came to the city as dairy farmers in
the 1960s, they were greeted by orchards. In the 1990s, the city went high-
tech, attracting high-skilled migrants. Fremont experienced significant eco-
nomic and population growth, though not on the scale of neighboring San
Jose. It is the largest suburb in the region, but Fremont has a similar feel to
other Bay Area suburbs. In interviews, several city officials emphasized that
Fremont is largely a bedroom community, one that is qualitatively different
from the central cities ringing the Bay.
By 2006, Fremont was home to 208,000 residents, 43% of whom were
born abroad. Fremont has the highest proportion of Asian migrants ð76%Þ
of the four cities, while 15% have origins in Latin America. As in San Jose
and San Francisco, about a fifth of Fremont’s immigrants are recent arriv-
als, and just over half ð53%Þ are naturalized citizens. Fremont’s foreign-
born have the highest median incomes of all four cities, and the incidence of
poverty is relatively low. Nevertheless, of those who are poor, almost half
ð48%Þ are immigrants. Among children in disadvantaged households, 72%
have at least one immigrant parent. Thus, while the proportion and number
of people living in poverty is lower than in the neighboring central cities,
among Fremont’s poor, immigrants are hit hard. They constitute a greater
proportion of the poor population than their share of the general population
and a higher proportion of poor residents than in San Francisco or San Jose.
Fremont resembles San Jose in its symbolic support for immigrants but
limited infrastructure for dealing with immigrant integration. Fremont
lacks an agency dedicated to immigrant affairs, and its Office of Neigh-
borhoods—which worked to promote civic engagement among low-wage
and immigrant communities—was defunded in 2005 under budget pres-
sures. In fiscal year 2005–6, Fremont’s operating budget was $233 million.
Two city councilors were Asian American in 2006, one with origins in India
and one of Chinese background.
Small Suburban City: Mountain View
MountainView, also situated onamajor regional transit line, lies betweenSan
Francisco and San Jose, across the Bay from Fremont. The city was incor-
porated in 1902 with barely 600 residents. By midcentury, the population
stood at 6,548, with only 9% born outside the United States ðABAG 2011Þ.
As in San Jose and Fremont, the second half of the 20th century brought
demographic growth and economic transformation. The city is home to sev-
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eral high-tech giants and a former naval facility now serving as a NASA
research site. Population growth has been more muted—in 2006, the popu-
lation was just over 71,000 residents—but immigration is as significant. In
2006, 40% of Mountain View residents were foreign-born: 45% from Asia,
33% from Latin America, and 17% from Europe. Slightly more migrants are
recent—30% had entered the country since 2000—and fewer are naturalized
citizens ð35%Þ. The proportion of immigrants among residents living in pov-
erty is the highest among the four cities, at 53%, as is the proportion of chil-
dren living indisadvantaged familieswithat least one immigrant parent, 81%.
MountainViewisthusasuburbwithasignificant immigrantpresence,manyof
whom have urgent human and social services needs.
Mountain View also lacks a municipal office dedicated to immigrant af-
fairs, relying instead on the leadership of its sole Latina councilwoman and
the work of the Human Relations Commission. Analogous to some of the
Washington, D.C., suburbs studied by Frasure and Jones-Correa ð2010Þ,
Mountain View has allowed the establishment of a day labor center, one of
only a few in the South Bay. Beyond facilitating employment, the center
mobilized the Latino community for a large immigrant rights march in 2006
ðTanenbaum2006Þ. Infiscal year 2005–6,MountainView’s operatingbudget
was $193 million.
DATA AND METHODS
We rely on four data sources: ð1Þ funding data on each city’s allocation of
CDBG funds to community organizations; ð2Þ a database of 6,828 formally
registered nonprofit organizations in the four cities; ð3Þ 142 in-depth in-
terviews with elected and appointed city officials, leaders of community
organizations, and immigrant advocates; and ð4Þ documentary informa-
tion from local governments, immigrant organizations, and local ethnic and
mainstream media.
Community Development Block Grants
Our primary outcome indicator is allocations from CDBG funds over three
fiscal years, 2004–5, 2005–6, and 2006–7, as reported in the Consolidated
Annual Performance and Evaluation Reports for each city we studied.14 The
14San Francisco is a city-county consolidation, whereas San Jose, Fremont, and Moun-
tain View are cities located in two different counties that include many other munici-
palities. Our study includes CDBG allocations only for these four cities, but not CDBG
allocations for Santa Clara County ðwhich includes San Jose and Mountain ViewÞ or
Alameda County ðwhich includes FremontÞ. Santa Clara and Alameda are very large
counties with dozens of municipalities that compete for county CDBG funds; inclusion
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CDBG program dates from 1974 and is one of the longest-running programs
of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ðHUDÞ. HUD
distributes grants across the country, using a standard formula. CDBG funds
must be spent on community development, including direct services to low-
and moderate-income persons, affordable housing, and infrastructure im-
provements; recipient governments must document that a majority of fund-
ing targets low- and moderate-income areas ðHandley and Howell-Moroney
2010Þ. Within these rules, local officials have substantial discretion over
CDBG allocations, with most funds dispersed among community organiza-
tions. Federal funds are thus allocated to governments via a formula that is
exogenous to local political dynamics, yet localities have significant control
over grants making ðRich 1993; Rosenfeld et al. 1995Þ. This makes CDBG
allocations a unique measure permitting comparison of municipal respon-
siveness to disadvantaged immigrant populations among old and new im-
migrant destinations, as well as big cities and small suburbs.
CDBG grants to community organizations are allocated through an open
and competitive process. In the cities we studied, once applications are re-
ceived, city commissions review them, formulate funding recommenda-
tions, and invite public feedback. City legislators review the recommenda-
tions, convene more public hearings where applicants can testify, and then
vote to finalize allocations.15 If successful, community organizations must
spend CDBG monies on programming in the city where they receive fund-
ing.
15There is one CDBG funding cycle per year, and the allocation process is similar across
cities. Cities typically issue requests for proposals in November, with applications due in
January of the following year. For the cities we studied, the commissions that review
CDBG proposals are the Citizen’s Committee on Community Development ðSan Fran-
ciscoÞ, the Neighborhood Services and Education Committee ðSan JoseÞ, the Senior Citi-
zens and Human Relations Commissions ðFremontÞ, and the Human Relations Com-
mission ðMountain ViewÞ. City legislators finalize allocations by April or May. Nonelected
staff administer the CDBG funds. These are the Mayor’s Office of Community Develop-
ment ðnow the Community Development Division within the Mayor’s Office of HousingÞ
in San Francisco, the Department of Housing in San Jose, the Human Services Department
in Fremont, and the Community Development Department in Mountain View. CDBG
funds are made available to grantee organizations for the fiscal year starting July 1.
of CDBG county funding would have added an extra layer of methodological and ana-
lytical complication. Despite this jurisdictional mismatch, CDBG grant allocations are
comparable across the four cities in large part because HUD rules require that county
funds only go to community organizations serving populations in counties’ unincorpo-
rated areas. Because nonprofits serve a wide range of clients, recipients of county CDBG
grants often also receive city CDBG grants. Our examination of the CDBG grantee lists
over 2004–7 for Santa Clara and Alameda Counties show that organizations receiving
county funds often received city funds aswell. CDBGmonies awarded to cities are amore
reliable metric to compare local responsiveness to immigrant communities. Other local
sources of discretionary funding, such as social service contracts, are managed by counties,
making it impossible to isolate contracts for a particular city.
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While elected officials ultimately determine CDBG allocations, city ad-
ministrators and nonelected officials can play important roles in grants mak-
ing, from encouraging organizations to apply and providing application as-
sistance to making funding recommendations. In the spirit of the original
public-private partnership model of the 1960s, HUD also requires cities to
engage in public outreach throughout the grants-making process, from es-
tablishing the guidelines used to allocate money to convening public hear-
ings before and after allocation decisions.16 Municipal differences in the de-
gree of outreach, and whether this includes immigrant communities, can
carry significant implications for which groups apply and eventually receive
funding.
CDBG funds are significant for both cities and community organiza-
tions. The CDBG program is the largest source of discretionary federal aid
awarded to local governments, and the amount of money involved is sub-
stantial ðBrooks, Phillips, andSinitsyn 2011Þ. In 2006, during ourfieldwork,
the federal government allocated $3.7 billion to formula grants ðBoyd 2011,
p. 13Þ. Among localities receiving grants, CDBG monies constituted 1.6%
of total spending ðBrooks and Phillips 2008, p. 253Þ. Contrary to the ex-
pectations of some economists who predicted that cities would reduce taxes
by the same amount as the federal grants received, cities that received
CDBG funds increased total expenditures by $0.77 on every dollar of grant
money ðBrooks and Phillips 2008, p. 246Þ. This represents real resources
for disadvantaged groups.
For community organizations, the award of a CDBG grant can have im-
portant spillover effects. Winning one type of grant often facilitates further
fundraising and increases the probability of future resources ðPanchok-
Berry, Rivas, and Murphy 2011Þ. Large service nonprofits hold an average
of six government grants and contracts per organization, with a median of
three distinct grants or contracts ðBoris et al. 2010Þ. Receiving public funds
can breed a virtuous revenue circle for organizations and also appears to in-
crease nonprofits’ ability to advocate for vulnerable populations ðBloemraad
2006; Child and Grønbjerg 2007; Mosley 2011Þ. Other researchers have used
CDBGallocations tomeasure local public policy responsiveness and resource
allocation to racialminoritypopulations ðBrowning,Marshall, andTabb1984;
Hero 1990; Rich 1993Þ. CDBG allocations thus provide some indication of
broader patterns of government support or exclusion.
We believe that our use of CDBG grants as an indicator of local re-
sponsiveness can be usefully extended to other localities. CDBG funds are
16HUD requires cities to develop five-year consolidated plans to identify the community
development goals against which CDBG applications are evaluated, and it requires com-
munity involvement in drafting the plans. HUD also mandates a citizen participation
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available to large and small cities—our four cities have received them for
over 30 years—and grants may go to different types of community organi-
zations, including those serving immigrants. On many fronts, central cities
and suburbs are hard to compare, but the terms of CDBG funding allow
for a useful comparativemetric. Thismetric also provides an innovativeway
to examine immigrant integration dynamics beyond standard individual-
level indicators such as educational attainment, language ability, and voting.
CDBG funding gets at group-level recognition and collective goods. We com-
pare the proportion of CDBG funding received by immigrant organizations
to the share of immigrants in the city’s population.
Nonprofit Organizations and Civic Capacity
It is difficult, however, for localities to support immigrant organizations if
few organizations exist and immigrant civic capacity is low. To receive
CDBG funding, organizations must be registered as 501ðcÞð3Þ nonprofit
organizations. We thus take immigrant civil society into account using a
National Center for Charitable Statistics ðNCCSÞ database of all 501ðcÞð3Þ
nonprofits registered with the Internal Revenue Service ðIRSÞ.17 Based
on the address provided to the IRS, we identified 6,828 organizations with
501ðcÞð3Þ status across the four cities. We coded each organization as pri-
marily an immigrant organization or not. We define immigrant organiza-
tions as nonprofits whose mission is to serve or advocate on behalf of one
or more immigrant communities, promote their cultural heritage, or engage
in transnational relations with countries of origin. We base the designation
of immigrant organization on cues in the organization’s name, informa-
tion in the group’s mission statement, in-depth interviews, media statements,
web descriptions, and other documentary sources, including local directories
of human service agencies.18 In total, we counted 1,151 immigrant organi-
zations, 17% of all registered nonprofits, which is amuch smaller share than
immigrants’ 38% of the population in the four cities. This figure corrobo-
rates other studies documenting immigrants’ underrepresentation in the
nonprofit sector ðCortés 1998; Hung 2007; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad
2008; Gleeson and Bloemraad 2012Þ.
We focus on immigrant organizations because mainstream organiza-
tions often have inadequate language services or do not provide assistance
17We excluded private foundations with 501ðcÞð3Þ status; they are often private tax
shelters and are treated as distinct entities in analyses by nonprofit scholars ðe.g., Boris
and Steuerle 2006Þ.
18Other studies of immigrant or minority nonprofits use different identification criteria,
including the origins of directors and board members ðHung 2007; De Vita, Roeger, and
Niedzwiecki 2009Þ or client characteristics ðCordero-Guzmán2005; deGraauw2008, 2012;
Martin 2012Þ. We focus on overall mission and activities using awide array of sources. For
details on methodology, see Gleeson and Bloemraad ð2012Þ.
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germane to immigrants, such as translation services, culturally appropri-
ate human services, or immigrant-related legal services. As others have ar-
gued, and our research shows, immigrant organizations are overwhelmingly
community-based and specialize in serving low-income, limited-English re-
sidents ðCordero-Guzman 2005; deGraauw 2008, 2012;Martin 2012Þ.Many
also build immigrants’ civic skills and leadership potential and advocate for
them to policy makers ðBloemraad 2006; de Graauw 2008, 2012; Gleeson
2008Þ, activities in line with the community empowerment models that ani-
mated early public-private partnerships under the War on Poverty.19
Interviews and Archival Evidence
To put funding allocations in context, we examined hundreds of pages of
city and federal documents to trace the CDBG allocation process and better
understand interactions between immigrant organizations and city officials.
These sources included materials such as the CDBG consolidated plans of
each city and reports of public hearings. Strikingly, while the CDBG pro-
gram has been around for decades, and all our cities have long histories of
receiving funds, formal reporting on the grants-making process is limited,
and it is far from transparent. None of the cities we studied disclosed infor-
mation on the organizations that applied but failed to receive funding, despite
our numerous inquiries to a broad range of individuals. We were conse-
quently forced to rely on lists of successful grantees from public documents
and requests for information.
We also conducted 142 in-depth interviews between 2004 and 2008.
These interviews probed local officials’ sense of responsibility to various con-
stituencies, including immigrants, and immigrant organizations’ view of their
relationship with city government.20 We interviewed at least two elected city
officials in each city, including council members, mayors, and representatives
of local school boards. We also spoke to nonelected city officials serving on
boards and commissions that work with immigrants, including the Human
Relations Commissions in Fremont and Mountain View, the Santa Clara
County Office of Human Relations, the San Jose Strong Neighborhood Ini-
tiative, and the Immigrant Rights Commission and the Office of Civic En-
gagement and Immigrant Affairs in San Francisco. Among immigrant orga-
nizations, we interviewed the executive director or another knowledgeable
individual about the organization’s history and activities. Interviews lasted
on average from one to two hours and followed a semi-structured format.
19Their nonprofit status bans immigrant organizations from partisan electioneering, but
they can advocate for members and clients and engage in limited lobbying ðBerry with
Arons 2005; de Graauw 2008Þ.
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FINDINGS: CITY FUNDING AND IMMIGRANT ORGANIZATIONS
Immigrants increasingly live in suburbs, but these newdestinations are slow
to respond to their foreign-born residents. As table 1 shows, a greater pro-
portion of residents in Fremont and Mountain View are foreign-born than
in the central cities, and while the two suburbs have, on average, a lower
percentage of poor people than the two central cities, immigrants make up a
larger proportion of the poor in the suburbs than in San Francisco and San
Jose. As smaller cities, Fremont and Mountain View had less funding to
allocate, making it harder to give many grants during the period of our
review. Nevertheless, none of the CDBG money that suburbs awarded to
nonprofits went to immigrant organizations in 2004–7, as shown in table 2.
The lack of funding is especially noteworthy given that the CDBG program
targets community development and services to low- and moderate-income
persons.21
In contrast, over the same three years, San Francisco gave grants to 38,
40, and 41 immigrant organizations, respectively, out of a total of 130, 151,
and 124 nonprofits funded. Immigrant organizations thus accounted for
between 26.5% and 33.1% of CDBG grant recipients, and they tended to
receive slightly more funding, on average, than nonimmigrant organizations.
Over $4 million went to immigrant organizations in each of the years stud-
ied, which equaled 34.2%, 33.7%, and 40.4% of all grants allocated to com-
munity organizations in 2004–5, 2005–6, and 2006–7, respectively. The
funding proportions are in line with the proportion of immigrants living
in San Francisco and the proportion of immigrants among the city’s poor
residents.
The situation in San Jose stands between that of the suburbs and San
Francisco. San Jose received a smaller entitlement grant than San Francisco
and allocated less CDBG money to community organizations, funding 39
groups in 2004–5, 38 in 2005–6, and37 in 2006–7.Amonggrantees, sevenwere
immigrant organizations in each funding cycle, representing 17.9%–18.9% of
all nonprofits funded. As in San Francisco, immigrant organizations received,
on average, a larger grant than nonimmigrant organizations, and the average
value of grants rose over time. In 2004–5, immigrant organizations received
18.4% of funding available to nonprofits; this increased to 23.5% and 27.5%
in subsequent years. The percentages are much lower than the proportion of
immigrants in the general population, 39%, or the percentage of immi-
21Our analysis assumes that we should expect some funding of immigrant organizations,
given the composition of the poor population in suburbs. Some might challenge this
assumption, expecting funding to go to umbrella organizations or groups focused on
other demographic specificities: preschoolers, youth-at-risk, seniors, or the disabled, re-
gardless of immigrant background. Under this assumption, the key empirical puzzle
remains: wewould need to explain why San Francisco and San Jose do nevertheless fund
immigrant organizations.
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grants among the poor, 42%, but we see evidence that immigrants’ needs
are somewhat visible to San Jose city officials who allocate and administer
CDBG funds.22
One possible explanation for the funding variation could be the absence
of immigrant organizations in suburban cities. However, our analysis of
registered 501ðcÞð3Þ organizations shows a substantial number of organi-
zations in each municipality, with between one and two immigrant orga-
nizations for every 1,000 foreign-born residents.While SanFrancisco stands
out for the sheer number of registered immigrant nonprofits, at 591, these
organizations constitute a smaller part of the total nonprofit universe of
4,203 organizations in the city, 14.1%, than in the other three cities. In the
suburbs, immigrant organizations account for 24.5% ðFremontÞ and 20.7%
ðMountain ViewÞ of all registered nonprofits; the proportion in San Jose is
the same as in Mountain View, at 20.7%. Thus, while the density of im-
migrant organizations is slightly higher in San Francisco—2.2 organiza-
tions per 1,000 foreign-born residents—these immigrant organizationsmust
compete within a much denser overall nonprofit infrastructure. For every
immigrant organization in San Francisco, there are six nonimmigrant or-
ganizations; the comparable ratio is 1:3 in Fremont and 1:4 in San Jose and
Mountain View. Lack of funding in suburban cities cannot be explained
by an absence of immigrant organizations.
Alternatively, suburbs might not directly support immigrant nonprofits
if instead they fund a few mainstream umbrella organizations that offer
immigrant-targeted services. To evaluate this possibility, we investigated
all grant recipients in Fremont and Mountain View and a sample of non-
immigrant grantees in San Jose and San Francisco from the list of all non-
profits that received any CDBG grant in each city during our 3-year period
ðsee app. AÞ. We examined whether the suburban nonimmigrant grantees
were qualitatively different than their central city counterparts.
They were not. In both central cities and suburbs, some nonimmigrant
organizations serve subgroups of immigrants. This is understandable given
the region’s demographics and nonprofits’ public service orientation. Kid-
ango, a nonprofit child development agency, is dedicated to a multicultural
curriculum, integration of families of diverse economic backgrounds, and
inclusion of special needs children. One branch received funding from the
city of Fremont and another from San Jose. In Mountain View, an employee
of the Community Services Agency, a CDBG recipient that provides emer-
gency assistance and social services, explained that “a community needs to
22The increase in allocated monies over this period reflects the city’s decision to give a
few immigrant organizations significant resources for infrastructure investments: a build-
ing purchase to expand services to the Korean American community, more office space for
a Japanese American group, and a grant to a Portuguese American group to renovate a
kitchen used in nutritional programs.
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be welcoming of its immigrant population.” The organization serves people
of various ethnoracial backgrounds, and the same employee noted that Rus-
sian immigrants often work as volunteers in the food pantry. Likewise, the
Ingleside Community Center in San Francisco, an organization that has long
served African-Americans, more recently began outreach to the growing Chi-
nese immigrant population in the neighborhood. Thus some suburban non-
immigrant nonprofits with CDBG grants provide services to immigrant res-
idents. But the same is true in San Francisco and San Jose, cities that also
fund immigrant-specific organizations. It is not the case that suburbs have
awarded grants to special umbrella organizations with immigrant-targeted
services as a distinct funding strategy.
In fact, there is substantial evidence that the service efforts of main-
stream organizations are inadequate in meeting immigrant needs. Santa
Clara County, which encompasses San Jose and Mountain View, conducted
a needs assessment in 2000 that included a random sample of residents
from the five largest immigrant groups in the county ði.e., Mexicans, Viet-
namese, Chinese, Filipinos, and IndiansÞ and a survey of public assistance
beneficiaries, including the top 16 immigrant nationalities receiving public
aid ðSanta Clara County 2000Þ. The two surveys found that, overall, im-
migrants receive only half the services that native-born residents do while
they have two to four times greater need. For example, 11% of immigrants
reported food insecurity compared to 3% of the native-born, yet only 47%
of immigrants on public benefits received food aid compared to 72% of
native-born residents ðSanta Clara County 2000, pp. 95, 101Þ. With regard
to health care, native-born residents were insured at a rate 12 times higher
than immigrants.
Other needs assessments have found thatmainstream organizations have
not invested sufficiently in multilingual and coethnic staff to serve immi-
grant communities adequately. In the words of one report, “Many immi-
grant community members, both young and old, are unaware of the health,
social and legal services available to them; cannot access them due to lan-
guage and cultural barriers; or are not comfortable seeking help outside of
the community” ðAhuja, Gupta, and Petsod 2004, p. 13; see also Petsod,
Wang, and McGarvey 2006; Santamaría and Palma 2008Þ. The Santa
Clara County needs assessment found that 64% of 36 nonprofit organiza-
tions surveyed reported that they needed to refer non-English-speaking
immigrants elsewhere for services but did not know where to send them
ðSanta Clara County 2000, p. 104Þ.
Thus, poverty statistics, needs assessments, and studies of nonprofits
serving disadvantaged residents all show that many immigrants have hu-
man and social services needs, including those living in suburbs, but that
they face inadequate community-based services. The Santa Clara County
needs assessment concluded that nonprofit organizations must offer ser-
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vices “in the heart of immigrant communities”; it specifically mentioned
downtown Mountain View as one ideal location. Yet in an interview, a
member of Mountain View’s Human Relations Commission, which over-
sees the CDBG allocation process, commented that among “the usual sus-
pects that come to our meetings,” the supporters of mainstream organiza-
tions—who are “for the most part, very intelligent, very well spoken”—have
limited awareness of the city’s diverse population. We now turn to inves-
tigate the reasons behind this disjuncture: the clear demographic presence
and needs of immigrants in suburbs but a lack of public funding for im-
migrant organizations.
UNDERSTANDING VARIATION: SUBURBAN FREE RIDING
Lack of CDBG funding in these suburbs cannot be explained by anti-
immigrant ideologies. Anti-immigrant attitudes characterize other subur-
ban destinations ðPerea 1996; Chavez 2008; Brettell and Nibbs 2011Þ, but
suburban officials in theBayArea usually appreciate immigrants’ economic
contributions and cultural diversity.23 During Fremont’s fiftieth anniver-
sary celebration, programming included cricket matches and Bollywood
dancing ðStaff 2006Þ. One appointed suburban official underscored that a
melting pot paradigm is “unrealistic, outdated, and to some people, offen-
sive” andproudly explained thatFremont “is in factmore diverse thanmany
larger cities. We have people here who speak 137 different languages.” In
Mountain View, despite battles over day laborers’ right to solicit work on
public streets, every city official we interviewed spoke highly of the city’s
DayWorker Center.Mountain View’smayor lauded the center as not just a
place for workers tomeet potential employers but also onewhere they could
receive services. “During the times that they’re not working, they offer classes
and that’s really beneficial,” he boasted. These suburbs eagerly reap the sym-
bolic, cultural, and economic benefits of their immigrant populations and
generally have a welcoming attitude toward immigrants.
Yet many suburban officials do not view immigrant organizations as
partners to receive city grants. Often officials do not see immigrant orga-
nizations as part of their municipality’s civic infrastructure. In some cases,
immigrants and their organizations have no civic visibility at all. In other
23While many city officials have multicultural mind-sets, there are pockets of anti-
immigrant sentiment among suburban residents, just like in big cities. A Fremont of-
ficial recounted that when a Chinese American city councilor, born in the United States,
proposed celebrating the national origins of city employees during the Fourth of July
parade, “he got nasty e-mails and letters, you know, telling him to go back to the country
he came from.” Similarly, although Mountain View compiles a “diversity calendar” and
supported May 1 immigrant rights marches, a representative of the Human Relations
Commission spoke about antagonism by long-time residents toward new immigrants,
including antagonism by some of the city’s established Mexican American residents.
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cases, suburban officials acknowledge immigrants’ presence but have little
understanding of their needs. Or officials contend that immigrants’ needs
are already served by organizations in other cities. Sometimes consciously,
but more often unwittingly, without calculated intent or animus, suburban
officials off-load human and social service provision for immigrants to
central city nonprofits, free riding off central cities’ funding of services and
organizations. Historically suburban residents took advantage of the jobs,
transportation, and recreation in central cities but did not contribute property
taxes or municipal levies to deal with urban poverty, thereby pitting subur-
ban and urban residents against each other. The new free riding, however,
produces civic and social inequalities among residents in the same suburban
jurisdiction.
This occurs through a variety of processes. Some suburban officials
simply know little about their city’s new demographics. Such invisibility
was epitomized in an interview with the executive director of a Fremont
city agency that oversees nonprofit service providers. Despite her many
years of experience, she recounted: “We’re applying for a mental health
grant to work with welfare recipients, and to our surprise one of the lan-
guage requirements for our area was Vietnamese. So, we must have some
folks who are out there who speak Vietnamese.” This official does not have
negative feelings toward immigrants; she simply does not identify immi-
grant residents, including thousands of Vietnamese origin, as a distinct part
of the city’s disadvantaged population.
In other cases, suburban officials know that immigrants live in the city, but
they have not reached out to immigrant organizations. The official head-
ing Fremont’s Human Relations Commission, the government body that
receives CDBG grant proposals and makes funding recommendations to
city council, could name very few immigrant organizations. Asked about
groups active in Fremont across a long list of topical areas, from arts and
culture tohousing andhealth, the official only listed oneAfghan organization,
a Sikh gurdwara, and a local resident active in the Muslim community.24
Similarly, in discussing the city’s fiftieth anniversary event, she recounted:
“We reached out to . . . business associations, to the Chamber of Commerce,
to all sorts of people. We reached out to the school communities, the school
districts, all the private schools, to the arts community, to all the artists, and
the symphonyand to the sports teamsand . . . toall thebunchofneighborhood
groups and PTAs and crime watch.” Immigrant organizations were notably
absent from her list, despite the 102 officially registered immigrant organi-
24The interview schedule asked respondents to name city organizations involved in arts
and music, education, health, senior citizen issues, labor unions, advocacy groups, ethnic
and cultural groups, naturalization, citizenship and voting, immigrant and refugee set-
tlement, civic clubs, neighborhood associations, housing affordability, domestic violence,
public safety and emergency preparedness, veterans groups, and religious organizations.
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zations identified in the NCCS database. In a similar manner, an official on
Mountain View’s Human Relations Commission, which also has a mandate
to evaluate and make recommendations on CDBG allocations, could not
name a local group that worked with immigrants or refugees other than the
DayWorker Center; NCCS data indicate that Mountain View is home to 46
registered immigrant nonprofits.25
It is not the case that suburban immigrant organizations shun partner-
ships with government as a matter of ideology. Our interviews, media sto-
ries ðe.g., Benson 2007Þ, and the financial reports of a few prominent sub-
urban organizations indicate that immigrant leaders welcome funding from
county, state, and federal governments. For example, the executive director
of the India Community Center ðICCÞ, located in the neighboring city of
Milpitas but with senior programs in Fremont, explained that ICC has
sought out government grants to support senior services, in addition to mem-
bership dues and individual and corporate donations that fund other activi-
ties. Yet immigrant organizations such as ICC repeatedly fail to appear on the
suburban rolls of CDBG recipients.
This absence reflects the often contradictory perspective suburban gov-
ernment officials hold toward these organizations. One discourse suggests
that well-organized immigrant organizations do not need government fund-
ing. A nonelected Fremont official explained, expressing admiration for
ICC’s activities: “Most organizations would ½use a paid position, ½but they
find highly-skilled volunteers to donate their time to them. I’m very im-
pressed with that.” Organizational prowess—usually something that city
officials appreciate in allocating grants—becomes a reason to not fund
organizations seen as having the wherewithal to organize themselves. Con-
versely, a lack of organizational capacity also serves as a rationale for avoid-
ing public-private partnerships. In considering the city’s Latino population,
many of whom live in low- or modest-income households, the same city of-
ficial said: “We have, I’m sure, a whole labor force of undocumented workers
from Mexico and Guatemala and other places, but for various reasons they
don’t get to organize. The places where they probably are most organized
are around certain . . . Catholic churches.” Seen to have limited civic infra-
structure, these immigrant residents’ needs are relegated to religious institu-
tions. Even when a highly disadvantaged group does organize, there is no
guarantee of CDBG funding. The Mountain View Day Worker Center,
which serves an overwhelmingly Latino immigrant clientele and is one of the
25The reactions in Fremont andMountain View can be found in other BayArea suburbs.
During an interview for a different study, an elected official in Sunnyvale—a suburb
betweenMountainViewandSan Jose—said that since “everyone is treated equally” in his
city, the suburb does not “have many organizations or problems” related to what he saw
as “special interest” immigrant activism. Forty-three percent of Sunnyvale’s population
was foreign-born in 2006.
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few active formal day labor centers in the SouthBay, received no CDBG fund-
ing from the city of Mountain View from 2004 to 2007 despite the mayor’s
admiration for the group’s work.
We believe that these contradictory rationales—immigrants as well or-
ganized enough not to get public funding or insufficiently organized tomerit
funding—arise because the social construction of target populations places
immigrants outside the circle of legitimate recipients of public grants, es-
pecially in suburbs. This is done in a variety of ways. A few suburban offi-
cials and civic leaders hinted that immigrants might not be fully local res-
idents since they retain ties to their countries of origin. As the head of a city
social service agency in Fremont put it, reflecting on the suburb’s immigrant
population, “a lot of the sort of people who ½have come to this country
recently—probably because of the Internet and business and world econ-
omy—they’re here, but one foot here and one foot still in the country that
they came from.” Another narrative suggests that immigrant suburbanites
are uniformly wealthy. A Fremont city councilor explained: “We’re not deal-
ing with the same kind of immigrant issues that most communities deal with
in terms of the low-skilled workers and all of the debate that you hear now
about the immigrant community. We’ve got one of the wealthiest immigrant
populations.” Silicon Valley is certainly home to high-skilled, well-off immi-
grants, but the parallel low-wage immigrant population often goes unno-
ticed. Asked specifically about the Latino population, a group with significant
pockets of poverty, the same official said there was no organized presence in
his city but that there seemed to be organizations in other cities that Fremont’s
Latinos could access.
Another discourse views immigrant concerns as particularly insular. An
elected official in Fremont, predicating his remarks with, “I don’t mean it
½as derogatory,” went on to explain that various organizations in the low-
income Afghan community were centered on “self-help issues” and “improv-
ing their own lot . . . mostly it’s for the welfare of their people. Help get
them educated; help, you know, ½with citizenship.” The label “their people”
and the claim of insularity contrasted with the official’s inclusive language
regarding another group: residents associated with the CDBG-funded Se-
nior Center. “We have a large number of active seniors,” the official praised.
These seniors are seen as part of the city’s civic community, while the social
construction of immigrant communities—as excessively transnational, rich,
small, or insular—places them outside of it. Such narratives legitimize the
lack of public-private partnerships, even in places such as Fremont, which
has welcomed one of the largest Afghan communities in the United States.
Importantly, the arguments articulated by suburban officials occur in a
regional context that feeds into rationales placing immigrant residents’
needs outside the suburb’s jurisdiction. It is impractical, according to a
number of suburban officials, for small cities to pay for immigrant services
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given the availability of services and immigrant organizations in neighbor-
ing big city jurisdictions. A Fremont city councilor explained, discussing
what he viewed as the small number of Vietnamese in his city, “Obviously,
there are Vietnamese people ½here, but my guess is that they probably go
to San Jose for their, you know, ethnic involvements.” Such arguments
carry some face validity. The Vietnamese-origin population in Fremont is
5,600, compared to almost 90,000 in San Jose, and Fremont’s operating
budget is a fraction of that of its big city neighbor. Yet a nontrivial segment
of Fremont’s most disadvantaged residents speak Vietnamese. They are
expected to rely on the nonprofit infrastructure in San Jose, which sits in a
different county, is not connected to Fremont via the region’s subway sys-
tem, and is a 30-minute drive or hour bus ride away. In a similarmanner, an
elected official inMountain View acknowledged, “It’s certainly very visible
that you have ethnic segments of the community,” but given limited re-
sources and a small city staff, the official explained that the suburb relies
on volunteers to address the needs of its ethnic communities.
Appeals to economies of scale and references to services available in other
jurisdictions are not used when it comes to childcare or homeless services, or
for programs targeting seniors or handicapped residents, populations that
received a substantial proportion of Fremont’s CDBG money in the period
we studied. We do not want to imply that these groups are not deserving of
public grants but rather that suburban officials do not reflect on the taken-
for-granted legitimacy of these groups compared to others. For example,
CBO grants for seniors, serving 21,000 residents over age 65, totaled over
$240,000 in 2004–5, but no Latino organization received CDBG support,
despite a Latino population of over 32,000.26 Asked explicitly about the
city’s Latino community, an elected Fremont official minimized the group’s
size by making explicit reference to other cities: “The percentage of Latinos
in Fremont ½is small compared to other communities.” Yet Fremont’s La-
tino population represents 15% of all city residents—a proportion on par
with San Francisco. Appeals to economies of scale—there are bigger immi-
grant populations in other cities with larger budgets, as well as a longer his-
tory of immigrant support services—help suburban officials account for the
absence of funding in their own municipality. Immigrant services become
the purview of the suburbs’ larger and presumably richermunicipal siblings.
Yet, paradoxically, the demographic growth of the suburbs, fed largely
by immigration, has increased the size of the CDBG entitlement grants
from the federal government in new destinations, but not in San Francisco.
In 2004, Fremont’s total CDBG grant was 85% larger than the one it re-
26The city also awarded over $250,000 in non-CBO funding from CDBG monies to the
city-run Senior Center in 2005–6.
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ceived in 1978;Mountain View’s CDBG grant in 2004was 38% larger than
in 1978.27 San Francisco, due to its stagnant population, received 3% less
in CDBG funds in 2004 compared to 1978. We would expect cities with
growing CDBG entitlement grants to have more room to fund new groups,
such as immigrant organizations.
And yet they do not. We label this phenomenon suburban free riding. It
results from suburban officials’ taken-for-granted ideas about suburban
life—often rooted in iconic images more appropriate to earlier decades—
and from assumptions about immigrants’ needs arrived at without dia-
logue with immigrant organizations.28 A Fremont city councilor of immi-
grant origins, for example, described a small group of residents very active
in city affairs who have “lived here forever, who ½see Fremont as a rural
community and not even as a suburban community.”These individuals still
imagine a place with fields and a time when the city “was fairly uniform
and unified.” In this context, immigration and minority issues are big city
problems, not those of a bedroom community. We speculate that especially
in regions with long-standing immigrant gateways such as San Francisco,
or even 21st-century gateways like San Jose, the presence of central cities
reinforces the notion that immigrant services are primarily big city respon-
sibilities.29
The staff of immigrant organizations in San Jose and San Francisco are
familiar with suburban free riding. An employee of a Vietnamese organiza-
tion in San Jose, which receives CDBG funds, explained that many clients
and volunteers come from outside San Jose, including Fremont. A staff mem-
27San Josebenefited themost frompopulation growth: its funding increased92% from1978
to 2004. We thank Leah Brooks for sharing her data set of CDBG funding across U.S.
localities ðsee Brooks and Phillips 2008; Brooks, Phillips, and Sinitsyn 2011Þ. Her data
count a municipality’s entire CDBG entitlement grant, including funding for capital pro-
jects and community organizations. We only focus on the latter.
28A community leader active in an all-Latina mothers’ group and her child’s PTA con-
tended that few city officials or local civic leaders reach out to Fremont’s Spanish-speaking
population: “Before I was PTA President, we had two or three Caucasian people that were
involved in PTA, and letters went home, but they went home in English. . . . So, by me
being there, and writing . . . in English and on the other side in Spanish . . . even though
there was a language barrier, the fact that I had sent the letter out in two languages . . .
there was a big change in ½PTA attendance.”
29Suburban free riding is not always vis-à-vis big cities; a few respondents suggested
neighboring suburbs took care of a particular immigrant-origin group. During an in-
terview with an official on the Fremont Senior Citizens Commission, when asked about
Portuguese-origin seniors, the official said the community is “mainly in Newark.” Asked
about those of Indian origin, the official pointed to programming in Milpitas. And when
asked about the city’s Vietnamese population, the commissioner reported not knowing
any Vietnamese organizations, “I know there is a Vietnamese community, but it’s not as
large as some other” communities.
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ber with La Raza Centro Legal, a CDBG grantee organization founded to
serve Hispanic immigrants in San Francisco’s Mission district, commented:
“We’ve been in the community since 1973, and we’ve built a reputation with
the high-quality legal services we provide. . . . I’d say that just under 50% of
our clientele comes from San Francisco, but a majority of our clientele comes
from SanMateo County . . . and as far as San Jose in the south.”An employee
of theVietnamese CommunityCenter of SanFrancisco, also a CDBGgrantee,
said that her organization traditionally served residents in the low-income
Tenderloin district but now also helpsVietnamese-speaking clients from south
of San Francisco and the East Bay. The widespread demand for services
highlights the success and regional reputation of these organizations but also
the absence of comparable immigrant-targeted services in the suburbs.
Officials in San Francisco and San Jose, like those in the suburbs, face
enormous budget challenges, but they view partnerships with immigrant
organizations as a productive and efficient way to address the needs of city
residents. The model of productive partnership goes hand-in-hand with a
strong self-image of the city as a culturally and economically diverse place.
A high-level administrator in San Francisco commented: “In a place as
diverse as San Francisco . . . where there is a significant immigrant and
refugee population, we can’t just idly stand by and ignore these people. . . .
Our efforts at reaching out to immigrants and refugees in this city, I think,
would be a lot less effective without the various immigrant groups that we
fund. We simply wouldn’t be able to reach into some pockets of the im-
migrant community. These organizations—and they’ll also tell you that—
they have a better ability to connect and deliver the kinds of services that
immigrants need.”
Officials in both central cities, but especially in San Francisco, consis-
tently talked about the advantages of partnerships with immigrant orga-
nizations, even though immigrants constitute a smaller percentage of their
overall city and poor populations than in the suburbs. San Jose and San
Francisco are not able to free ride on the resources of other jurisdictions
and must invest in local immigrant organizations, although they vary in
the extent to which they do.
UNDERSTANDING VARIATION: A CONTINUOUS AND 21ST-CENTURY
IMMIGRANT GATEWAY
San Jose and San Francisco differ from the suburbs and each other in the
proportion of CDBG funding they allocate to immigrant organizations.
Many more immigrant organizations in San Francisco enjoyed, collectively,
a larger share of CDBG funding. These public-private partnerships occur
even though immigrant organizations face resource competition from amuch
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denser civil society: San Francisco counts over five 501ðcÞð3Þ organizations
per 1,000 city residents, almost double the concentration of nonprofits in
Mountain View and more than two times the concentration in San Jose and
Fremont ðsee table 2Þ. A key explanation for more equitable immigrant
funding, we believe, lies in San Francisco’s history of immigration.Historical
legacies have produced a broad and sophisticated immigrant civic infra-
structure and a normative orientation among elected and nonelected city
officials that immigrants can and should make claims on city resources.
San Francisco’s history as a continuous gateway has produced a diverse
set of immigrant organizations with expertise, networks, and a strong sense
that they are legitimate stakeholders in city affairs. Considering all regis-
tered nonprofit organizations in the four cities, 41%–45% acquired 501ðcÞð3Þ
status before 1990, as shown in table 2.30 Focusing only on immigrant orga-
nizations in San Francisco, 50% are long-standing nonprofits, registered be-
fore 1990. Roughly a dozen date back to the late 19th century, when the city
experienced significant migration fromChina, Italy, Ireland, the Philippines,
and Russia. Immigrant organizations in the other three cities are, on aver-
age, more recently registered. Even in San Jose, home to over 350,000 im-
migrants, only 30% of immigrant organizations were formal 501ðcÞð3Þ or-
ganizations before 1990, a much “younger” organizational profile.
An older stock of immigrant organizations helps incubate a new gener-
ation of immigrant organizations in San Francisco as the immigrant pop-
ulation changes. An employee of the International Institute of San Fran-
cisco ðIISFÞ explained:
We were founded in 1918 to help early immigrants to this country, many of
them from Europe. And we still do that type of service work today, but our
work also lives on through a number of other organizations. . . . We founded
the Chinese Newcomers Service Center in 1969. And what is now the
Southeast Asian Community Center, we started that in 1976, and then we also
had a hand in getting seed funding to start the Filipino Newcomer Service
Center, this was also in the 1970s. . . .We created these spin-offs because there
was a demand for services for specific groups of immigrants and refugees, and
these services at the time IISF couldn’t provide or simply couldn’t provide fast
enough.
New organizations can build on the know-how and reputation of estab-
lished groups.
Would-be leaders of new immigrant organizations, who are sometimes
staff or volunteers from existing organizations, can also access an array of
30This is the date that the IRS ruled an organization a legal nonprofit, a designation
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resources for leadership development and grant writing in San Francisco.
An employee of the Zellerbach Family Foundation, a grant-making insti-
tution in San Francisco noted: “An organization called CompassPoint pro-
vides workshops to teach nonprofit staff leadership and management skills
and also strategies to increase the impact of their advocacy. . . . Then there’s
Partnership for Immigrant Leadership and Action, which is . . . a nonprofit
that specifically provides technical assistance to other nonprofits in low-
income immigrant communities.” Thus, successive generations of immi-
grant organizations and an identifiable infrastructure of support groups gen-
erate knowledge, expertise, and confidence to engage local government.
Civic infrastructure is not enough, however. A continuous history of immi-
gration also creates a normative environment where the provision of immi-
grant services is an accepted city practice and where immigrant organizations
arevisible, legitimatepartners of citygovernment.Manyof theCDBG-funded
immigrant organizations that we visited in San Francisco prominently dis-
played awards of appreciation from the Board of Supervisors and the May-
or’s Office, which shows on a more symbolic level that immigrant organiza-
tions are incorporated into the city’s civic fabric. The city also recognizes
that disadvantaged populations can evolve as migration flows change. San
Francisco’s 2005–10 consolidated plan, which structures CDBG priorities,
explicitly states that community development must address “the unantici-
pated needs of existing and emerging populations.”31
In contrast, suburban officials often appear reluctant to challenge long-
standing grant-making patterns. One suburban official, who participated
in awarding grants, acknowledged: “You see ½immigrants in the grant pro-
cess. We had the Afghan women come to us and request money. . . . ½ But
we only get a certain amount ½of money. . . . You’re going to take money
from somewhere else to give it to them.” In San Francisco, city officials ac-
knowledge such trade-offs, but they view immigrant organizations, includ-
ing newer groups, as legitimate grantees.
San Francisco officials explicitly mention that public-private partner-
ships leverage the linguistic skills and service work of immigrant organi-
zations. One high-level San Francisco administrator said: “I think literally
31San Francisco’s 2005–10 consolidated plan states, in its discussion of goals and its def-
inition of community development, that “in recognition of the rapidly changing demo-
graphics and character of San Francisco, ½the Mayor’s Office of Community Devel-
opment will make funding available to address the unanticipated needs of existing and
emerging populations/communities that cannot be addressed through our already iden-
tified strategies. During the past 25 years, this strategy has enabled San Francisco’s com-
munity development program to be a national leader in using CDBG to respond quickly
and effectively to the AIDS crisis, the plight of refugees and immigrants, and the challenges
of creating economic access for traditionally marginalized sub-populations” ðCCSF 2006,
p. 63Þ.
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50% of our city’s delivery of services is accomplished through nonprofits,
particularly in the health field, social services, and services for the aging
population. Additionally, nonprofits play a key role in identifying problems
for us to solve. . . . ½Immigrant organizations should be there, because es-
sentially they represent people who have yet to gain access to government.”
City officials also partner with immigrant organizations because they offer
channels of communication to city residents. One supervisor spoke approv-
ingly of the advocacy and service work of immigrant organizations: “Non-
profitsbriefedmeandmystaff . . .andwerecognized somestartling facts, that
about a quarter of San Franciscans are less than proficient in English. . . .
The entire city is at potential risk if the government cannot communicate
with the citizenry in times of emergency, certainly, but on an on-going basis,
we have services. That is why government exists, to provide services, and
if we can’t communicate with a quarter to a half of our citizenry, then what
are we doing?” In San Francisco, elected and nonelected officials discussed
public-private partnerships in similar ways to officials interviewed by Fra-
sure and Jones-Correa ð2010Þ in the suburbs ringing Washington, D.C.
Leveraging nonprofits’ service work is thus possible in large cities and
in smaller suburbs. Our focus on the social construction of target popula-
tions helps explain, however, where and when city officials see such public-
private partnerships as advisable. This elucidates the dynamics behind
suburban free riding, and it helps explain differences in funding between
a traditional immigrant gateway like San Francisco and a 21st-century
gateway such as San Jose. Like suburban officials, a few San Jose coun-
cilors had a hard time naming a single immigrant or ethnic organization
in the city. One councilor acknowledged that “there are ½immigrant groups
who interface with the City Council to try to settle issues,” but then ex-
plained, “I don’t know all the names of these organizations” after having a
hard time naming one. In fact, we counted 412 registered immigrant non-
profits in San Jose. Some San Jose officials, like some of their suburban
counterparts, viewed relations with immigrant communities as occurring
via liaisons rather than direct partnerships ðBloemraad and Gleeson 2012Þ.
A San Jose councilor talked about the importance of working with “a
representative from the consulates” to address immigrants’ issues. The
emphasis on intermediaries rather than direct public-private partnerships
and the more limited knowledge of immigrant organizations help explain
why, of about 38 San Jose–based organizations funded annually through
city CDBG grants from 2004 to 2007, only seven were immigrant organi-
zations. This included only one Latino organization in a city where 31% of
the population is Latino. San Francisco, where Latinos make up 14% of
the population, funded more Latino organizations, groups that city officials
readily identified by name.
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Immigrant organizations in the 21st-century gateway city of San Jose
have not yet achieved the experience, legitimacy, and authoritative voice
to challenge such exclusions. They have, on average, shorter institutional
histories since immigrants formed a much smaller proportion of the popu-
lation from the 1950s to the 1980s. The leader of a pan-Asian organization in
San Jose contrasted his group’s growing pains with allied, and more es-
tablished, organizations in San Francisco: “It was great that we have op-
erated for three years, but we did run across some issues within the orga-
nization that would have helped tremendously if we would have had some
sort of document to go back to.” Shorter institutional histories hinder im-
migrant advocates’ ability to secure funding.
It is also harder for immigrant leaders to find adequate resources to set up
and run new organizations. For example, when San Jose’s Parks and Rec-
reation Department mandated 501ðcÞð3Þ status for all organizations receiv-
ing city support, including those renting city properties, a young second-
generation Latina who heads an Aztec dance troupe had difficulties buying
insurance and learning how to file the paperwork needed to register as a
nonprofit. San Jose is home to leadership development organizations, such as
the San Jose Leadership Council, which provides technical assistance and
training for individuals willing to pay its $2,195 tuition bill. Given the sub-
stantial fee, its business orientation, and limited outreach to immigrants, the
Leadership Council does not play a role analogous to Partnership for Im-
migrant Leadership and Action in San Francisco. Santa Clara County has
offered an immigrant leadership course, but participation is by nomina-
tion and only a limited number of scholarships are available to low-income
participants.
San Jose’s sheer size—including a larger budget and more developed
bureaucracy—does generate more openings for immigrant populations to
partner with city officials compared to the suburbs. San Jose’s Strong Neigh-
borhood Initiative ðSNIÞ directed redevelopment funding and staff outreach
to “blighted” areas, including some immigrant neighborhoods with under-
developed civic infrastructures. One city employee explained, “The intent
½was to reach out to everybody within the area to try to bring them to these
meetings, to begin a conversation. . . . We would actually do grassroots
organizing to get people to comeout . . . going door-to-door, talking to people,
asking them what their issues were and then try to get them to come out to
these community-wide meetings.” Several SNI staff were multilingual, and
occasionally they helped neighborhood organizations with CDBG grant
applications. One SNI staff member noted that these efforts increased civic
engagement by bringing more people into municipal discussions and fos-
tered networks among participants. It also increased residents’ sense of le-
gitimacy: “They feel far more entitled, far more inclined to say, ‘Hey, this is
an issue our ½City Council should have had.’” Compared to the suburbs,
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San Jose’s larger bureaucracy makes it easier for city officials to interact
with, and even organize, city residents, including immigrants. This helps cul-
tivate public-private partnerships with immigrant communities and gener-
ates a greater sense of civic inclusion on both sides.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION AND FUTURE EXTENSIONS
The service and advocacy work of community organizations is largely con-
ceived of as taking place in the urban core of large central cities. Yet immi-
gration, gentrification, and new patterns of job growth have rendered sub-
urban communities much more diverse—in socioeconomic, linguistic, racial,
and cultural terms—than ever before. These same dynamics have also con-
tributed to the rapid growth of 21st-century gateway cities. Are governments
in these new destinations building partnerships with immigrant residents
and their organizations, especially with those of low or modest income?
Based on comparisons of CDBG allocations in four Bay Area cities, we
conclude that immigrant organizations are incorporated in the traditional
immigrant gateway of San Francisco; they are partially seen, but inade-
quately funded, in San Jose, a 21st-century gateway; and they are invisible
or ignored in the new suburban destinations of Fremont and Mountain
View. In San Francisco, immigrant organizations receive a share of public
resources on par with immigrants’ proportion among city residents and
among the poor; in San Jose, officials allocate some resources to immigrant
organizations but much less than immigrants’ prevalence among the poor.
Most striking, in the large and smaller suburban cities of Fremont and
Mountain View, no immigrant organization garnered a single dollar in
CDBG funding over the three-year period we studied, even though they are
home to a higher proportion of immigrant residents than the big cities and
even though immigrants who face linguistic, economic, and legal hardships
form a larger proportion of their poor populations—the very group CDBG
grants target. For welfare state researchers, these findings parallel those of
Allard, who concludes that “the amount of assistance received in a social
service-based system is determined by the neighborhood in which one lives,
not one’s level of need” ð2009, p. 36Þ. For scholars of immigration, funding
disparities support the contention that researchers must distinguish between
types of immigrant-receiving jurisdictions when studying the “new geogra-
phy” of immigrant settlement ðSinger 2004; Frey 2006; Jones-Correa 2006;
Singer et al. 2008Þ. Our attention to public grants should also encourage
scholars of immigration to examine not just individual-level integration out-
comes but also community-level dynamics of incorporation such as public
goods allocation to collective actors.
Beyonddocumenting intercity variation,wedevelop anargument forwhat
accounts for these differences. We contend that San Francisco’s continuous
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exposure to migration over the 20th century, as compared to the other cities’
more recent experiences, has produced a vibrant civic infrastructure of im-
migrant organizations that have the experience, networks, and expectation
that they should partner with city officials. Their expectations are, for the
most part, shared by local officials, who draw on a narrative of the city as
an immigrant destination and on a history of public-private partnerships to
justify including immigrant organizations in social service provision.
Our research also shows that government officials in the immigrant sub-
urbs free ride on the funding that neighboring cities provide to immigrant
organizations and the services those groups deliver, even thoughCDBGfunds
are supposed to be directed to the residents of a specific city, not a region.
While we might expect that smaller communities with less entrenched bu-
reaucratic interests would be able to pivot with agility to respond to disad-
vantaged immigrant residents, we find no evidence of this in the Bay Area.
Suburban officials explain their lack of outreach and support as stemming
from capacity constraints: suburbs have less money, less staff, and less expe-
rience dealing with immigrant issues. This explains part of the difference
between the suburbs and big cities—more developed bureaucratic structures
in San Francisco and San Jose have played a role in facilitating partnerships
with immigrant organizations—but suburban officials also use the services
offered by immigrant organizations in other cities to perpetuate the lack of
investment in their own jurisdictions.
Suburban officials in a politically progressive region such as the BayArea
celebrate diversity among their residents, but they employ various narrative
strategies to place immigrants outside socially constructed target popula-
tions. This distinction occurs evenwhenCDBG entitlement grants to suburbs
have increased in recent decades largely as a result of immigration-driven
population growth. For some suburban officials, immigrants are completely
invisible. For others, they are too transnational, too rich, or too organized for
public support or, conversely, they are too insular, too small, or too unor-
ganized. Although geographers, sociologists, and scholars of urban politics
increasingly highlight the rise of “ethnoburbs” and “edge gateways” as a
critical frontier for immigrant integration ðLi 1998; Logan et al. 2002; Price
and Singer 2008Þ, our research indicates that elected and nonelected sub-
urban officials have not yet come to terms with their cities’ changing demo-
graphy even if their political ideology welcomes diversity.
Given welfare state retrenchment, the consequences for disadvantaged
immigrant residents and the nonprofit organizations that serve the poor are
significant. Immigrants in Silicon Valley have two to four times the service
needs of native-born residents, but they are about half as likely to receive
help ðSanta Clara County 2000Þ. An analysis of 250 nonprofits in the area
concludes that organizations serving communities of color ðmost of which
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serve immigrantsÞ had 40% less income and smaller staffs and were more
dependent on volunteers than other nonprofits ðLaFrance Associates 2005,
p. 28Þ. To deal with high need but inadequate resources, immigrant orga-
nizations sometimes team up with larger, more resource-rich groups. In
many cases, however, they are simply unable to offer the type of services
and programming that they would like or that are needed.
Some may wonder whether our results merely reflect the rational polit-
ical exchange dynamics of the modern day urban machine discussed by
Marwell ð2004, 2007Þ. According to such an argument, funding equity in
San Francisco is driven by electoral politics, whereas suburban officials get
away with free riding due to a high proportion of noncitizen immigrants. It
is the case that 62% of San Francisco’s immigrants are U.S. citizens, while
the proportion is only 35% in Mountain View. San Jose and Fremont fall in
between, with just over half of their immigrant residents holding U.S. citi-
zenship.
We cannot rule out a role for electoral politics, but the evidence suggests
that any such link is far from direct. San Francisco’s legislative body, the
board of supervisors, was dominated by white, native-born officials in 2006.
It is not the case that San Francisco reached out to immigrant organizations
thanks to a diverse local legislature or patronage-style ethnic politics. Further-
more, the proportion of naturalized immigrants who were living in poverty
in San Francisco in 2006, 9%, was lower than the proportion of poor native-
born residents ð11%Þ and far below the poverty rate among noncitizen mi-
grants ð18%Þ. Immigrants with the greatest human and social services needs
are the ones without voting rights, suggesting that a rational political ex-
change model cannot adequately explain variation among Bay Area cities.
Organizations representing noncitizens could, of course, exert political
pressure in other ways ðOkamoto and Ebert 2010; Voss and Bloemraad
2011Þ. Several of the immigrant organizations we studied can be catego-
rized as “hybrid organizations” that combine nonprofit service provision
with volunteer efforts and advocacy ðMinkoff 1995; Hasenfeld and Gidron
2005; de Graauw 2008Þ. Sometimes such organizations help spearhead pro-
tests, letter-writing campaigns, or other nonelectoral mobilization, acting akin
to social movement organizations. Future research should consider whether
social movement theories can help account for variation in localities’ respon-
siveness to immigrant residents, heeding the call by Andrews and Ed-
wards ð2004Þ for more cross-fertilization between scholars of the nonprofit
sector, interest groups, and social movement organizations. However, grants-
making activities such as CDBG allocations fall more squarely within
regular politics and bureaucratic inclusion rather than the realm of con-
tentious politics. Relatively few social service nonprofits actively mobilize
members and clients into disruptive protest behavior, preferring instead to
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engage in insider advocacy and bureaucratic strategies ðMosley 2011; de
Graauw 2012Þ.
The story we tell might change with time, particularly in more politically
progressive places or as the line between bureaucratic inclusion and con-
tentious mobilization blurs in the face of anti-immigrant initiatives at the
local and state levels.32 We only collected three years of CDBG data given
substantial hurdles in securing and verifying grant information and a de-
sire to match the financial data to the timing of our field research. Since
then, Fremont and Mountain View have taken small steps to fund immi-
grant organizations. Fremont finally awarded the AfghanCoalition, founded
in 1996, a CDBG grant in 2010–11, but it was the only immigrant organi-
zation to receive funding. Similarly, theMountain ViewDayWorker Center,
also founded in 1996, received a $10,000 CDBG grant in 2007–8 and in
2008–9, but it was the only immigrant organization funded ðCity of Moun-
tain View 2009, p. 21Þ. Given a political climate that is not particularly hos-
tile to immigrants, this suggests that funding patterns and conceptions of
immigrant organizations as deserving partners might change in the region
over time. Since demographic realities have changed much more quickly,
however, tens of thousands of migrants remain with limited organizational
sources of assistance, a situation likely replicated across the United States and
perhaps in other countries.
Future studies must assess how broadly our findings hold in areas with
different immigration histories and regional dynamics. There is evidence
that our empirical story holds in other places, although research has focused
more on establishing spatial mismatch than explaining it. In a study of com-
munity organizations serving immigrant women, Truelove ð2000, p. 141Þ
found that while only 24% of recent immigrants and 26% of established im-
migrants in metropolitan Toronto lived in the central city, fully 53% of im-
migrant service providers were located in the city of Toronto, a traditional
gateway in Canada. In a study of metropolitan Chicago, over half of the
suburban leaders surveyed felt that their municipality did not need assis-
tance in developing strategies to serve immigrants and indicated no aware-
ness of immigrant populations in their jurisdiction even though the foreign-
born population across the region averages 19% ðMetropolitan Mayors
Caucus 2012Þ. Suburban free riding around traditional gateway cities is likely
a widespread phenomenon, as hinted at in research on NewYork ðMarwell
2004, 2007; Cordero-Guzmán 2005Þ and Los Angeles ðValenzuela 2006Þ.
32The Mountain View Day Worker Center, which was very visible in the 2006 immi-
grant rights protests, received a CDBG grant in 2007–8 and 2008–9; it was the only
immigrant organization in the city to do so. Their protest activities might have helped
increase their civic presence and ability to secure CDBG funding.
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Dynamics might vary in regions where the dominant central city is not a
traditional immigrant gateway, such as Washington, D.C., or Atlanta.33 In
such places, elected and nonelected suburban officials might take greater
leadership in exchanging public funding or technical support for privately
organized service provision, as in the case of day labor centers ðFine 2006;
Frasure and Jones-Correa 2010Þ. Without a traditional gateway, immi-
grant suburbanites might face lower hurdles to being seen as legitimate tar-
gets of social policy. A study of nonprofits in the Washington, D.C., metro-
politan region provides mixed evidence for this proposition. It found that
over time more immigrant organizations were locating in the suburbs; by
2007, of 533 immigrant organizations in the region, 41% were located in
Maryland, a proportion on par with the 43% of immigrant residents ðde Leon
et al. 2009, p. 5Þ. Conversely, however, 24% of immigrant organizations—
often those withmore financial resources—were located inWashington, D.C.,
but only 6% of the region’s immigrants lived in the capital. Organizational
leaders there recounted some stories similar to those we heard, such as the
perception that all Asian migrants are rich and without service needs.
We conclude that a key obstacle for immigrants residing in municipali-
ties outside traditional gateway cities is that they are not viewed as legiti-
mate interlocutors and civic partners by city decision makers. Particular
social constructions of immigrant residents and of the municipality—for
example, as a bedroom community without needy immigrants—contribute
to a lack of public-private partnerships, as does a less seasoned immigrant
civic infrastructure. The growing research on new immigrant destinations
should consequently move beyond simple juxtapositions between progres-
sive and anti-immigrant locales. Instead, scholars need to consider how
characteristics such as city size, immigrant history, and location in a metro-
politan region affect responses to immigration, paying attention to the social
construction of legitimacy—of people and organizations—and civic infra-
structures. Adopting a regional approach, as we do here, illuminates how
suburbs can free ride on central cities’ resources. The fact that such free rid-
ing occurs in the Bay Area—an unusually progressive region with relatively
generous public spending on services, an active civil society, and a very high
proportion of immigrant residents—raises the possibility that free riding and
a lack of investment in immigrant social services might bewidespread across
the United States.
33Such dynamics might also be affected by the history of nonprofit service provision to
poor, native-born minorities. The four cities in our study have small African-American
populations, 7% of San Francisco’s residents and 3% in San Jose. It is possible that with
a larger, long-standing African-American population, immigrants might benefit from
building off the black community’s civic infrastructure or, conversely, face additional
competition for resources and greater challenges in modifying established social con-
structions of disadvantaged populations.
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Community-Based Organizations Receiving CDBG Grants, Funding in Dollars,
Mountain View, 2004–7
CBO Grantees FY 2004–5 FY 2005–6 FY 2006–7
Clara-Mateo Alliance Shelter. . . . . . . . . 7,000 5,590 4,429
Community Services Agency . . . . . . . . . 87,407 90,903 65,048
Economic and Social Opportunities . . . . 30,000 30,000 13,656
Emergency Housing Consortium . . . . . . 16,027 18,786 89,885
Mayview Community Health Center . . . 8,107 6,388 5,062
Mid Peninsula Housing Coalition . . . . . 717,328
Project Sentinel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,163
Second Harvest Food Bank . . . . . . . . . 8,459 4,741 3,757
Senior Adults Legal Assistance . . . . . . . 6,000 2,930 2,322
Sierra Vista I Rehabilitation . . . . . . . . . 255,000
Social Advocates for Youth. . . . . . . . . . 7,500
Total funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425,500 876,666 187,321
NOTE.—Authors’ calculations from CDBG data from the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development ðannual CAPER reportsÞ for City of Mountain View.
TABLE A2
Community-Based Organizations Receiving CDBG Grants, Funding in Dollars,
Fremont, 2004–7
CBO Grantees FY 2004–5 FY 2005–6 FY 2006–7
4C’s Child Care Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19,989
Bay Area Community Services, Adult Day Center . . . 36,701 36,701 36,701
BRIDGE Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 800,000 50,000
California School for the Blind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27,561
Citizens Housing Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,000
Community Child Care Coordinating Council . . . 19,989 19,989
Community Resources for Independent Living . . . 10,100
Deaf Counseling and Referral Agency . . . . . . . . . 7,000 7,000
Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity . . . . . . . 31,110 32,666 34,902
Kidango . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200,064 142,443 87,736
LIFE Elder Care, Meals on Wheels . . . . . . . . . . 49,972 49,972 49,972
Project Sentinel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75,000 75,000 75,000
Safe Alternatives to Violent Environments Shelter. . . 74,042 40,228 56,228
Satellite/AEA ðSatellite Housing SeniorÞ . . . . . . . 144,431
Tri-City Homeless Coalition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155,000 200,000
Tri-City Health Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100,000 250,000 250,000
Tri-City Volunteers Facility Renovation . . . . . . . 277,714
Women on the Way to Recovery Center . . . . . . . 50,000
Total funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,548,409 986,560 1,088,242
NOTE.—Authors’ calculations from CDBG data from the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development ðannual CAPER reportsÞ for City of Fremont.
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TABLE A3
Community-Based Organizations Receiving CDBG Grants, Funding in Dollars,
San Jose, 2004–7
FY 2004–5 FY 2005–6 FY 2006–7
Immigrant organizations:
Ethiopian Community Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36,103 34,297 30,290
Filipino-American Senior Opportunities
Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36,202
Korean American Community Center . . . . . . . . . . . 241,796 250,000
Mexican American Community Services Agency . . . . 333,899 287,011 253,481
Portuguese Organization for Social Services and
Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130,357 110,803 245,592
Santa Clara County Asian Law Alliance . . . . . . . . . 55,855 50,269 44,395
Vietnamese Voluntary Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84,043 76,738 70,211
Yu-Ai Kai/Japanese American Community
Senior Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92,971 156,393 167,007
Total funding, immigrant CBOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 769,430 957,307 1,060,976
Nonimmigrant organizations:
Alliance for Community Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,721 20,635 20,635
Bill Wilson Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41,374 39,305 34,712
Catholic Charities of San Jose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180,534 226,582 203,295
Community Technology Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,793 20,703 20,703
Concern for the Poor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30,410
Deaf Community, Advocacy and Referral Agency. . . 29,040 27,588 27,588
Economic and Social Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560,000 541,622 560,000
Emergency Housing Consortium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63,095 56,785 50,149
Family Supportive Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28,889 28,889
Franklin-McKinley Education Foundation . . . . . . . . 202,007
Fresh Lifelines for Youth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40,006 81,828 72,266
Friends Outside in Santa Clara County . . . . . . . . . . 31,030
InnVision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108,606 103,176 93,875
Kidango . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193,287
Legal Aid Society of Santa Clara County . . . . . . . . . 269,069 242,621 214,257
Live Oak Adult Day Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30,496 28,971 28,971
Loaves and Fishes Family Kitchen . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,687 19,653 19,653
Mental Health Advocacy Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24,824 23,583 23,583
Next Door Solutions to Domestic Violence . . . . . . . . 116,882 121,953 107,701
Outreach and Escort, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45,347 40,048
Project Sentinel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267,615 258,833 228,550
Rebuilding Together Silicon Valley . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45,000 43,523 60,000
Respite and Research for Alzheimer’s Disease . . . . . 31,030 29,478 29,478
Sacred Heart Community Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,859 24,566 24,566
San Jose Conservation Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187,061 162,830 149,649
San José Smart Start Family Childcare . . . . . . . . . . 208,781
Santa Clara County Black Chamber of Commerce . . . 93,920 90,838 93,920
Santa Clara University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54,927 26,531 26,531
Santa Clara Valley Blind Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108,427 101,004 95,131
Second Harvest Food Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18,618 17,687 17,687
Senior Adults Legal Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91,023 81,921 72,348
Services for Brain Impaired. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,687 19,653 19,653
Silicon Valley Economic Development Corporation . . . 287,481 278,047 287,481
Silicon Valley Independent Living Center. . . . . . . . . 10,343 9,826 9,826
YWCA in Santa Clara Valley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175,062 148,803 131,420
Total funding, nonimmigrant CBOs . . . . . . . . . . . 3,408,688 3,124,788 2,792,565
NOTE.—Authors’ calculations from CDBG data from the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development ðannual CAPER reportsÞ for City of San Jose.
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Community-Based Organizations Receiving CDBG Grants, Funding in Dollars,
San Francisco, 2004–7
FY 2004–5 FY 2005–6 FY 2006–7
Immigrant CBOs:
African Immigrant and Refugee Resource Center . . . 67,000 77,000 30,000
Arab Cultural and Community Center . . . . . . . . . 60,000 40,000 38,000
Arriba Juntos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38,000 38,000 110,000
Asian and Pacific Islander Wellness Center . . . . . 25,000 43,000
Asian, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211,180 210,889 175,000
Asian Law Caucus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55,500 55,500 53,500
Asian Neighborhood Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391,000 269,000 292,860
Asian Pacific American Community Center . . . . . 67,500 60,000 58,000
Asian Women’s Shelter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39,500 31,500 35,500
Bindlestiff Studio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,000 60,000
Brava! for the Women in the Arts . . . . . . . . . . . . 47,000 47,000 45,000
Career Resources Development Center . . . . . . . . . 90,000 80,000
Central American Resource Center ðCARECENÞ. . . 55,000 40,000
Centro del Pueblo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58,000
Centro Latino de San Francisco. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,000
Charity Cultural Services Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125,000 100,000 80,000
Chinatown Community Development Center . . . . 431,761 420,535 435,000
Chinese for Affirmative Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110,000 115,000 100,000
Chinese Newcomers Service Center . . . . . . . . . . . 106,000 106,000 96,000
Chinese Progressive Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40,000
Dolores Street Community Services . . . . . . . . . . . 12,000
Donaldina Cameron House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45,000 115,000 35,000
Filipino-American Council of San Francisco . . . . . 50,000
Filipino-American Development Foundation. . . . . 205,000 85,000 190,000
Gum Moon Residence Hall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,000 15,000
Instituto Familiar de la Raza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45,000
Instituto Laboral de la Raza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68,000 68,000 68,000
Japanese Community Youth Council . . . . . . . . . . 100,000
Jewish Family and Children’s Services. . . . . . . . . 67,744
Jewish Vocational and Career Counseling Service. . . 81,317 90,300 60,000
La Casa de las Madres . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52,000 77,000
La Raza Centro Legal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125,000 125,000 115,000
La Raza Community Resource Center . . . . . . . . . 50,000 50,000
Manilatown Heritage Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,000
Mission Economic Development Association. . . . . 417,000 460,000 383,000
Mission Hiring Hall, Inc.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131,000 119,000 162,250
Mission Language and Vocational School, Inc. . . . 125,000 275,000 125,000
Mission Learning Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106,500 75,000 75,000
Mission Neighborhood Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70,000 205,000 92,000
Mujeres Unidas y Activas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,000 50,000
Nihonmachi Legal Outreach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93,000 57,639 93,001
Nihonmachi Little Friends. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67,000
On Lok Day Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114,000 100,000
San Francisco Conservation Corps—Wu Yee-
Generations Child Development . . . . . . . . . . 60,000
Self-Help for the Elderly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80,500 80,500 207,000
Southeast Asian Community Center . . . . . . . . . . . 226,500 226,500 200,000
Vietnamese Community Center of San Francisco . . . 50,000 50,000 35,000
Vietnamese Elderly Mutual Assistance
Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35,000 50,000 35,000
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Vietnamese Youth Development Center . . . . . . . . 40,000
West Bay Pilipino Multi-Service Corp. . . . . . . . . . 95,000 95,000
Wu Yee Children’s Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84,000 139,000 55,000
Total funding, immigrant CBOs . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,277,258 4,359,107 4,107,111
Nonimmigrant CBOs:
Acorn Institute, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,000 30,000
African American Art and Cultural Complex . . . . 245,000 55,000
A Home Away from Homelessness. . . . . . . . . . . . 35,000
AIDS Housing Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,000 35,000
AIDS Legal Referral Panel of the SF Bay Area . . . . 39,500 78,190 84,500
Arc Ecology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,000 20,000
Arc of San Francisco. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175,000
Ark of Refuge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439,364 12,000
Bar Association of San Francisco Volunteer Legal
Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30,000
Bay Area Community Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40,000
Bay Area Legal Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42,000 42,000 40,000
Bay Area Video Coalition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100,000 60,000
Bayview Community Collaborative . . . . . . . . . . . 23,000
Bayview Hunter’s Point Center for Arts and
Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40,000 103,000
Bayview Hunters Point Multipurpose Center . . . . 60,000
Bayview Hunters Point Multipurpose
Senior Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,000
Bernal Heights Neighborhood Center. . . . . . . . . . 248,800 210,000 215,000
Board of Trustees of the Glide Foundation. . . . . . 186,000 30,000 48,000
Booker T. Washington Community Service Center. . . 61,000 61,000 45,000
Boys and Girls Clubs of San Francisco . . . . . . . . 80,400 624,350
Brothers against Guns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55,000 40,000
California Lawyers for the Arts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,000
Catholic Charities CYO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61,500 76,500 45,000
Central City Hospitality House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92,150 51,650 31,650
Children’s Council of San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . 30,000 30,000 60,000
Clever Homes LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223,125 126,000
Community Alliance for Special
Education ðCASEÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,000 25,000 25,000
San Francisco LGBT Community Center. . . . . . . 100,000 100,000
Community Design Center. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155,437 35,000
Community Housing Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96,085 122,000 115,000
Community United Against Violence . . . . . . . . . . 27,000 27,000 27,000
Community Vocational Enterprises . . . . . . . . . . . 41,500 51,875 50,000
Community Youth Center-San Francisco
ðCYC-SFÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73,000 73,000 71,000
Compass Community Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37,000 37,000 37,000
CompassPoint Nonprofit Services 103,950 43,950 35,000
Conard House, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,100
Earned Asset Resource Network ðEARNÞ . . . . . . 25,000 50,000 50,000
Economic Opportunity Council of San Francisco . . . 25,000 15,000 38,000
Ella Hill Hutch Community Center . . . . . . . . . . . 203,200 225,000 140,290
Episcopal Community Services of San Francisco. . . . 30,000 100,000 100,000
Eviction Defense Collaborative, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . 25,000 30,000
Family School. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,000
Family Service Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226,000
Friends of the Urban Forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60,000 40,000
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Friendship House Association of American
Indians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36,900
Girls After School Academy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40,000 40,000
Goodwill Industries of San Francisco, San Mateo,
and Marin Counties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75,000
GP/Todco, Inc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210,000 100,000 94,000
Growth and Learning Opportunities,
Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27,600 27,600
Haight Ashbury Food Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65,000 45,000 25,000
HAPPY ðHaight Ashbury Play Program
for YouthÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35,000
Hearing and Speech Center of Northern
California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45,000 55,000 45,000
Henry Ohlhoff House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120,000
Holy Family Day Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33,500
Homeless Children’s Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40,000
Homeless Prenatal Program, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80,000
Hunter’s Point Boys and Girls Club. . . . . . . . . . . 30,000 20,000
Hunters Point Community Youth Park
Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125,000 105,000
Independent Living Resource Center of San
Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60,000 60,000 60,000
Ingleside Community Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70,500 63,450 60,000
Inner City Youth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,000 50,000
Iris Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,000
Jamestown Community Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60,000
Janet Pomeroy Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87,000 100,000
John W. King Senior Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125,000 100,000 100,000
Juma Ventures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55,000 75,610 70,610
Larkin Street Youth Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61,000 61,000 61,000
Lavender Youth Recreation and Information
Center ðLYRICÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80,000 66,000 65,000
Legal Assistance to the Elderly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30,000 30,000 30,000
Life Frames, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,000
Literacy for Environmental Justice . . . . . . . . . . . 19,000
Lutheran Church of Our Savior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34,000 59,900
Lyon-Martin Women’s Health Services . . . . . . . . 77,500 77,500 77,500
Mission Education Projects, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65,000 50,000 37,500
National Community Development Institute . . . . . 40,000 25,000
Network for Elders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58,000 63,000 50,000
New Leaf Services for Our Community . . . . . . . . 55,000 55,000 55,000
Northeast Community Federal Credit Union . . . . 195,000 230,000 210,000
Northern California Community Loan Fund . . . . 40,000 40,000
Northern California Service League . . . . . . . . . . . 68,000 68,000 66,000
Opnet Community Ventures, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,000 100,000
Portola Family Connections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,000 85,000 48,000
Positive Resource Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95,000
Potrero Hill Neighborhood House . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,000 30,000
Positive Resource Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115,000 90,000
Private Industry Council of San Francisco . . . . . . 70,000
Providence Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41,600 15,000
Rebuilding Together San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . 20,000
Recreation Center for the Handicapped . . . . . . . . 70,000
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Renaissance Entrepreneurship Center. . . . . . . . . . 436,500 428,500 350,000
Renaissance Parents for Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125,000 100,000
Richmond District Neighborhood Center . . . . . . . 26,000 12,000 30,000
Sage Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141,000 15,000
Samoan Community Development Center . . . . . . 60,000 60,000 60,000
San Francisco Child Abuse Prevention Center—
Talk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32,500 32,500 30,000
San Francisco Conservation Corps—Bernal Heights
State Pre-School. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44,845
San Francisco Conservation Corps—Catholic
Charities—Children’s Village . . . . . . . . . . . . 23,510
San Francisco Conservation Corps—Dr. Martin
Luther King Childcare Center. . . . . . . . . . . . 50,000
San Francisco Conservation Corps—Noe Valley
Co-op Nursery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55,000
San Francisco Conservation Corps—Rainbow
Infant Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64,000
San Francisco Conservation Corps—Sojourner
Truth Child Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40,000 54,544
San Francisco Conservation Corps—Whitney
Young CDC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34,592
San Francisco Foundation Community Initiative
Funds/SFFSN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,000
San Francisco Housing Development
Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250,000 100,000
San Francisco Lighthouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,000
San Francisco Parents Who Care. . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,000
San Francisco Study Center. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,000 410,000
Somarts Cultural Center ðwith partnersÞ . . . . . . . 25,000 70,000
South of Market Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100,000 100,000 100,000
Southwest Community Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . 120,000 66,500 88,000
St. John’s Educational Thresholds Center . . . . . . 25,500 25,500
St. Vincent de Paul Society of San Francisco . . . . 45,000 45,000 45,000
Sunset District Community Development
Corporation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70,000 75,000
Sunset Youth Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,000
Swords to Ploughshares Veterans Rights
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40,000 40,000 40,000
Telegraph Hill Neighborhood Association . . . . . . 125,000 102,000 30,000
Tenderloin AIDS Resource Center . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,000
Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87,500 87,500 87,500
Tenderloin Neighborhood Development
Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358,000 288,000 271,000
Tides Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89,000 361,361 284,361
Together United Recommitted Forever
ðT.U.R.F.Þ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,000 50,000 50,000
Toolworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47,000 47,000 56,085
United Council of Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . 58,575
Urban Housing and Development Corporation . . . 25,000 50,000
Urban Resource Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34,000
Urban University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,000 50,000
URSA Institute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,000
Visitacion Valley Community Center, Inc. . . . . . . 54,000 203,000
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Visitacion Valley Community Development
Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271,000 266,000
Visitacion Valley JET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100,000 90,000
Volunteer Center Serving San Francisco and
San Mateo Counties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29,600 29,600
Walden House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16,000
Westside Community Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45,000 30,000
Women’s Foundation of California . . . . . . . . . . . 85,000 35,000
Women’s Initiative for Self Employment . . . . . . . 100,000 100,000 100,000
YMCA of San Francisco—Chinatown . . . . . . . . . 115,000
YMCA of San Francisco—Richmond. . . . . . . . . . 67,600 11,000
Young Community Developers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218,595 75,000 73,000
Total funding, nonimmigrant CBOs . . . . . . . . . 8,231,506 8,565,111 6,062,987
NOTE.—Authors’ calculations from CDBG data from the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development ðannual CAPER reportsÞ for City and County of San Francisco.
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